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ABSTRACT
Although self-esteem reactivity plays a crucial role in the diathesis/stress model of 
depression, refinement of the interactions between variables included in this model is 
required. Specifically, the current research examined the extent to which cognitive- 
priming versus mood-state theory explains changes in participants’ self-evaluations 
across multiple domains after exposure to experimental procedures that simulated 
positive and negative life events. Of the 212 undergraduate student participants who 
completed the pretest phase, 179 (128 female, 51 male) participants completed the 
experimental phase. Eighteen participants were excluded from the experimental phase 
due to elevated depression scores. The experimental methodology involved random 
assignment of participants to one of four mood induction procedures (MIP). MIPs were 
either positive or negative in mood, and either referenced the self or avoided reference to 
the self. In addition to mood and self-reference, other factors hypothesized to influence 
self-evaluation change included, a) the importance ascribed to self-evaluation domains, 
and b) overgeneralization, a cognitive vulnerability argued to predispose individuals to 
depression.
Mood induction procedures produced self-evaluation changes among the important 
domains of self, and these patterns of change were interpreted within Beck’s (1987) 
conception of sociotropic and autonomous self-schemata subtypes. Bower’s (1981) 
associative network theory provided an additional theoretical context for understanding 
the results, which were largely supportive of cognitive-priming theory. Unimportant self- 
evaluation domains were largely unaffected by the MIPs, contrary to hypotheses based on
111
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the mood-state theory, demonstrating the significant role of importance for the process of 
self-evaluation.
Overgeneralization also influenced self-evaluation change, however, results directly 
contrasted predictions; participants who reported low and medium, rather than high, 
levels of baseline overgeneralization reported decreased self-evaluations. Nevertheless, 
results offer further support for cognitive-priming conceptualizations of self-esteem 
reactivity, particularly the strong association between overgeneralization and fluctuations 
in autonomous domains of self. Theoretical implications related to the trait nature of 
overgeneralization (cognitive process) and self-schemata (cognitive structures) are 
discussed. The advantages and limitations of employing priming methodologies within 
cognitive research are also reviewed.
IV
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Depression is currently one of the most common of all disorders seen in 
primary care settings (Arean, McQuaid, & Munoz, 1997). Lifetime prevalence rates 
of depression have been estimated to be as high as 17% (Kessler et. ah, 1994), and a 
recent analysis places the 12-month prevalence rate for depression in Canada at 6% 
(Stephens, Oulberg, & Joubert, 1999). Depressive symptoms are significantly 
associated with chronic health problems and physical restriction (Stephens et. ah, 
1999), as well as increased risk of suicidal behaviors (Teuting, Koslow, &
Hirshfeld, 1981). The total annual cost of depression for the United States has been 
estimated at $44 billion (Greenberg, Stiglin, & Finkelstein, 1990), which includes 
direct health care costs of treatment and indirect costs incurred through lost work 
days, mortality, morbidity, and decreased productivity (Zhang, Rost, Furtney & 
Smith, 1999).
Self-esteem has been studied as an important determinant of mental health, 
and research indicates that people with low self-esteem report significantly higher 
levels of life stress (Stephens et al., 1999), and have an increased risk of suicidal 
behavior (Beautrais, Joyce, & Mulder, 1999). Both depression and self-esteem have 
been connected with substance abuse among adolescents (Wasson & Anderson, 
1995). Elucidation of factors that impact upon depression onset and maintenance, as 
well as the role of self-esteem in these processes, would likely lead to improved and 
more cost-effective treatment strategies.
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The construct of “self” plays a significant role in theoretical and research pursuits 
that examine ontological determinants of depression (Alloy, Abramson, & Hogan,
1997; Hammen, 1985; Showers, Abramson, & Hogan, 1998). A clear pattern emerging 
from empirical investigations is that individuals experiencing depression engage in 
chronic negative self-evaluations (Kemis et al., 1998). A review of recent literature 
suggests that self-esteem that is overly reactive to daily life stress places individuals at 
a heightened risk for depression (Roberts & Gotlib, 1997; Roberts & Monroe, 1994). A 
prevailing cognitive formulation of depression capable of explaining this finding is the 
Diathesis-Stress model. Within this framework, preexisting cognitive vulnerability 
factors (the diathesis) are postulated to contribute to a depressive response to negative 
life events (the stress) that hold implications for an individual’s sense of self.
Beck (1967, 1976,1987) proposed that a depressed individual’s sense of self is 
best described within the context of a depressive self-schema. A self-schema has been 
defined as a cognitive structure composed of self-descriptive attributes or traits 
represented in an organized fashion in semantic memory, with exposure of one attribute 
automatically leading to activation of the others. The function of a depressive self­
schema involves the biased processing of self-referent information, such that self- 
evaluations are negative and often lead to self-disparaging comments, low expectations 
of personal effectiveness, and harsh self-punitiveness (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998; 
Segal & Vella, 1990). Cognitive vulnerabilities represent variables that measure the 
mechanistic operations of depressive self-schemas, which lead to fluctuations in self­
esteem and subsequent depression.
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An ongoing area of debate within this field is whether negative cognitive structures 
involving the self cause, or are merely associated with, depression (see Kelvin, Goodyer, 
Teasdale, & Brechin, 1999 for a review). Early research investigating this debate 
provided equivocal results (Persons & Miranda, 1992), with some research supporting the 
predictive validity of cognitive vulnerabilities (Hammen, Marks, Mayol, & deMayo,
1985; Metalsky, Halherstadt, & Abramson, 1987), whereas other research suggested a 
non-causal, concomitant function (Dobson, 1986; Kuiper, Olinger, & McDonald, 1988; 
Swallow & Kuiper, 1987). Efforts to reconcile contradictory evidence have variously 
focused on the notion of activating latent cognitive vulnerabilities before their predictive 
function occurs (Segal & Ingram, 1994), matching individual differences in cognitive 
vulnerabilities to specific types of negative life stress (Hammen, Marks, Mayol, & 
deMayo, 1985), and the use of prospective studies that better address questions of 
causality (Edelman, Ahrens, & Haaga, 1994; Kemis et al., 1998). Although these 
research efforts provide further support for the Diathesis-Stress model of depression, not 
all controversies have been put to rest.
One contentious issue surrounds the specific mechanisms responsible for the 
activation of depressive self-schemas. Two opposing theories, the mood-state and the 
cognitive-priming perspective, propose different causal mechanisms. The mood-state 
hypothesis (Brosse, Craighead, & Craighead, 1999; Miranda & Gross, 1997) predicts that 
because depressive thoughts about the self likely develop in a negative emotional context, 
they should be linked to the associated mood in memory. Accordingly, derogatory self- 
evaluations, indicative of low self-esteem, remain latent until cued by the reemergence of 
their associated mood-state. In contrast, the cognitive-priming hypothesis (Slyker &
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McNally, 1991; Riskind, 1989) posits that negative life events that reference the self 
prime negative cognitive structures independent of their effects on mood. It is the 
cognitive aspect of an experience that influences peoples’ self-esteem. Determining the 
primacy of either cognition or emotion as the primary mechanism responsible for self­
esteem reactivity requires a combined focus on both the self-referent nature of life events, 
as well as the personal importance of self-evaluations that differentially influence a 
person’s sense of self-worth.
Research exploring these contentious issues has theoretical merit. Further 
elaboration on the primacy of cognition or emotion in the activation of a depressive self­
schema would have a direct influence on theoretical formulations of depression. 
Examination of potential interactions between a cognitive vulnerability and specific life 
events, and determining whether activation of the vulnerability is necessary before it 
moderates self-esteem reactivity, would also further refine the Diathesis-Stress model of 
depression. Finally, a better understanding of whether importance impacts the process of 
self-evaluation would contribute to the advancement of knowledge by providing greater 
specificity for existing depression models.
Clinically, elucidating the factors that cause/moderate reactivity in self-esteem is 
worthy of study given the observed role that self-esteem plays in the development of 
depression. This worth is evident in the cognitive-behavioral approach to therapy, which 
involves an initial examination of the individual’s self-schemas and addresses their 
assumptions about the self (Freeman & Dattilio, 2000). The emotion versus cognition 
primacy debate is also applicable to psychological treatment interventions. Some 
therapies (cognitive/behavioral) target the correction of distorted cognitions that represent
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cognitive vulnerabilities, whereas other therapies encourage clients to process unresolved 
emotions (emotion-focused). Freeman and Fusco (2000) clarify the clinical importance of 
understanding the overlap between cognitive vulnerabilities and a depressive self-schema 
in their discussion of the therapeutic process; “the distortions become the thematic 
directional signs that can then be used to point to the underlying schema” (p. 37).
Research on this topic can also benefit treatment interventions for mental disorders 
other than depression. For example, two main criteria associated with borderline 
personality disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders (4̂  ̂ed.,
1994) involve; a) identity disturbances with severely unstable self-image or sense of self, 
and b) severe reactivity of mood (depression) leading to marked instability. Research that 
incorporates both self-esteem reactivity and variables derived from a depression model 
may also strengthen future therapeutic work with this population.
Definitions of Constructs 
Research in the area of self psychology has been hindered by definitional confusion. 
A primary source of confusion is the ambiguous distinction between self-concept and 
self-esteem, terms that researchers have often used interchangeably (Shavelson et al., 
1976). Hattie (1992) states that self-concept and self-esteem represent the two main 
categories focused on in self research, and that these terms signify different aspects of the 
self system. Although this statement is echoed by a majority of researchers (Brinthaupt & 
Erwin, 1992; Campbell, 1990), the conceptual distinction remains somewhat unclear. 
Reasoner (1986), for example, proposes that self-esteem is made up of five components, 
one of which is self-concept. In contrast, Byrne (1996) states that self-concept, which 
includes cognitive, affective and behavioral aspects, is a much broader construct within
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the self system than self-esteem. Self-esteem is conceived of as a “more limited 
evaluative component of the broader self-concept term” (Byrne, 1996, p. 5). Campbell’s 
(1990) information processing framework also proposes an overlap between these terms. 
She argues that “evaluation (self-esteem) may play a critical role both in the structure of 
the self-concept and in its interface with external information” (p. 539). Campbell’s 
proposal of evaluative (self-esteem) and knowledge (self-concept) components of the 
self-system are closely mirrored by Brinthaupt and Erwin (1992), who argue that self- 
concept represents self-descriptions, whereas self-esteem represents self-evaluations.
One factor potentially useful in clarifying the close connection between self-esteem 
and self-concept is the element of importance. James’ (1890) early writings on self- 
concept postulated that an individual’s global self-esteem is largely influenced by their 
perceived competence in domains of importance. This sentiment remains a focal point for 
current research on the self (Harter, 1996; Marsh, 1986,1995; Sedikides, 1995).
“Domains of importance” can be understood as representing the structure of the self- 
concept or self-description/knowledge components that individuals hold for themselves. 
Hattie (1992) distinguishes between self-concept and self-esteem based on the extent to 
which the self attribute being investigated is important. Accordingly, self-evaluations will 
occur for different domains of the self-concept, but these evaluations will impact upon 
self-esteem only if they refer to domains considered important by the individual.
Theories of Self-concept 
Numerous theoretical frameworks have been proposed to account for the construct 
of self-concept. Differences between these theoretical frameworks relate to both the 
underlying structure of the self-concept, as well as the appropriate relations among the
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elements composing the self-concept. A discussion of contemporary theories of self- 
concept must initially pay tribute to the past writings of James (1890). His conception of 
self discriminated between two fundamental aspects; an “I-self” and a “Me-self”. The 
process of organizing and interpreting one’s experiences (self-evaluations) was the role 
of the subjective I-self. The I-self was contrasted with the Me-self, which represented a 
collective understanding of things objectively known about the self (self-descriptions). 
James postulated that the I-self was the active agent responsible for constructing the Me- 
self (Harter, 1996), which again highlights the complex interactions within the self 
system.
Another early writer who examined the self was Cooley (1902). He incorporated 
social processes into the development of self-concept. Cooley’s “looking glass self” 
suggests that self-worth is directly related to an individual’s interactions with others. 
Positive or negative regard from significant others represents a social mirror through 
which people detect their opinions towards the self. This early social conception of the 
self also remains viable in present day theories and research.
A more recent theory is offered by Shavelson (1976) who argues that self-concept is 
constructed via self-perceptions, which are formed through experience with, and 
interpretations of, the environment. These self-perceptions are particularly shaped by 
evaluations of significant others, reinforcements, and behavioural attributions of the self 
and others. Markus (1977, 1980, 1990), working from a social-cognitive framework, 
postulates that the self represents a dynamic system of constructs that are collectively 
labeled cognitive self-schemas.
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Markus’s programmatic research provides an information-processing model for 
researching self. She defines self-schemas as “cognitive generalizations about the self, 
derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of self-related 
information contained in the individual’s social experience” (Markus, 1980, p.64). These 
self-schemas also influence how information related to the self is attended to, interpreted, 
stored, and retrieved (Markus, 1977). Dobson (1986) makes the link between self­
schemas and self-concept explicit by asserting that self-schemas define our sense of self 
by the process of identifying, and allowing into memory, information relevant to our self- 
concept.
Although the construct of self-schema has been criticized (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983, 
1986) on the grounds that its existence can not be directly verified, its operation on 
human information-processing styles can be observed and measured. Research 
examining the role of self-reference in schematic processes (Dobson, 1986) provided an 
appropriate methodology for early studies. Self-reference tasks typically require 
individuals to rate a series of adjectives for their personal relevance. Endorsement of 
certain types of adjectives, reaction times for such ratings, as well as recall of the 
adjective list allow indirect examinations of particular types of self-schemas. Empirical 
support for the self-schema construct is obtained by the finding that recall and ratings of 
self-referent information, as well as judgements about the self, are performed more 
efficiently and accurately than similar recall or judgments of material irrelevant to the 
self (Dobson, 1986; Segal & Vella, 1990; Teasdale & Dent, 1987), or information that 
focuses on others (Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982; Mathews & Bradley, 1983).
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Further support for the existence of self-schemas is provided by Kuiper (1981), who 
had individuals rate a list of personality adjectives in terms of their self-reference and 
self-description. Reaction times for these ratings were analyzed and indicated that the 
degree of self-description (low, medium, high) created an inverted-U shape for the length 
of self-referent ratings. High and low self-referent judgements were made more quickly 
relative to medium judgements, indicating that descriptions that clearly reflect or do not 
reflect the self-schema are processed more quickly.
Markus and Nurius (1986) expand upon self-schemas by positing that all individuals 
possess “possible selves”, which represent schemas of potential conditions of the self to 
be imagined, hoped for, or dreaded. These possible selves “provide an evaluative and 
interpretive context for the current view of the self” (p. 995). An important aspect 
incorporated into Markus’s (1980) writings on possible selves and self-schemas indicates 
that people hold multiple self-views that represent domain-specific knowledge structures, 
which collectively embody the core of the self-concept. The overlap between the 
evaluative component of the self (self-esteem) and the knowledge component of the self 
(self-concept) is evident again.
Global versus Multidimensional Models of Self-concept 
The issue of domain-specific knowledge structures discussed by Markus (1980) is 
important for theoretical models of the self. Is the construct of self-concept best 
understood as a global entity, or is it composed of multiple dimensions? Both James 
(1890) and Cooley (1902) articulated an overall or global sense of self-worth. However, 
James also was the first to propose a multidimensional model of self, which set up a 
hierarchy of the self -system with material and social aspects of the self in a subordinate
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role to a more enduring spiritual self. An examination of empirical findings related to 
these models helps to answer this question. Children have been shown to hold distinct 
evaluative judgements for the self across different domains, which led initial proponents 
of the unidimensional model (Piers & Harris, 1977) to later conclude that self-concept is, 
in fact, multidimensional in nature.
The construct validity of multidimensional models of self are currently well 
supported in the literature and this conception is argued to capture the phenomenology 
associated with the process of self-evaluation (Bracken, 1996; Harter, 1985,1990; Marsh, 
1986, 1987, Marsh & Hattie, 1996). Shavelson and colleagues (1976) proposed a model 
of self-concept that integrates a global sense of self into a multidimensional perspective. 
Echoing the early work of James (1890), these theorists developed a hierarchical model 
(refer to Figure 1) of self-concept that locates global evaluations of self as a higher order 
factor that comprises multiple, domain specific self-concepts. Although these specific 
domains are correlated, they can be interpreted as separate constructs. The notion of a 
global self-concept appears to blur the distinction between self-esteem and self-concept. I 
suggest that this higher order factor may actually represent a global level of self-esteem, 
based on self-evaluations of competencies in distinct domains of self-concept.
The hierarchical, multidimensional model provides a broad framework for exploring 
the structure of the self-concept. Based on Shavelson et al.’s model. Marsh developed a 
series of measures (Self Description Questionnaires I -  III; 1986,1987, 1989) which 
assess self-concept at different ages. Based on his research with late adolescents, Marsh 
revised Shavelson’s model by dividing the peer scale into same sex and opposite sex 
dimensions, and added scales to represent emotional stability, problem solving.
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religion/spiritual, honesty/trust, and a global self-concept scale. Furthermore, he 
questioned the validity of a strong hierarchical approach to self, for, although the 
observed pattern of correlations among the different dimensions of self-concept were 
consistent with expectations, the correlations were very small (mean r -.09).
Confirmatory factor analysis research, however, strongly supports the construct validity 
of these self-concept measures for all proposed self-concept dimensions (Marsh, 1990).
Importance of Self-concept Domains
A major criticism levied against the hierarchical model is that it doesn’t account for 
the possibility that domains of self-concept may be differentially important to global self- 
concept. Recall that the Jamesian (1890) perspective postulates that individuals who feel 
competent in areas that they believe are important will have a healthy global self-esteem, 
whereas feelings of incompetence in these important areas leads to a derogatory global 
self-esteem. Conversely, self-concept in domains deemed unimportant by an individual 
should not have an influence on global self-esteem (Byme, 1996; Harter, 1996).
Kelly (1955) incorporated the role of differential importance into a hierarchical 
theory of self by proposing that some aspects of the self represent “core” aspects that are 
relatively high in personal descriptiveness and importance, whereas “peripheral” aspects 
are relatively low in personal descriptiveness and importance (Harter, 1996; Sedikides,
1995). Peripheral aspects are argued to play a trivial role in the maintenance of personal 
identity and self-esteem. Kelly’s (1955) theory is supported by research reported by 
Markus and Wurf (1987) who showed that certain self-descriptions are indeed high in 
personal relevance and function as core characteristics, compared to peripheral 
characteristics that were rated as less personally relevant.
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A current area of debate related to the importance of self-concept domains 
focuses on the appropriate method of weighting importance ratings: nomothetic vs. 
idiographic. A nomothetic approach follows a strict hierarchical model and proposes that 
normative importance (i.e., group mean ratings of importance for self-concept domains) 
should be used to predict global self-concept. The idiographic approach, however, 
postulates that self-concept may be hierarchically organized but this hierarchy differs 
from person to person. Thus, intra-individual differences in importance ratings (i.e., 
differential importance) should be used to predict global self-concept (Pelham, 1995).
Supporting the nomothetic approach is the research of Harter (1985,1990) who has 
consistently shown that competence in areas that are deemed important by group norms 
are more highly correlated with global self-esteem (r = .70) than competence in domains 
rated as unimportant (r = .30). Marsh (1993) has also shown that normative importance 
ratings accounted for more of the variance in global self-concept than that accounted for 
by differential importance ratings. Pelham (1995), however, has cogently argued that an 
idiographic approach needs to be considered, for, although normative importance plays a 
large role in predicting global self-concept, differential importance is still a significant 
predictor of global self-concept when normative importance is statistically controlled for. 
Additionally, Pelham (1995) argues that differential importance may be more predictive 
of global self-concept for individuals who possess relatively negative overall^ self- 
concept rather than positive overall self-concept. Pelham (1995) concludes that 
“researchers who wish to understand self-esteem must focus on the intra-individual 
patteming of people’s self-views (and their investments in these self-views)” (p. 1164).
' Overall self-concept refers to a composite measure of multiple domains of self-coneept, excluding global 
self-concept.
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Despite the disagreement over whether importance of self-concept domains should be 
investigated with a nomothetic versus idiographic approach, both perspectives emphasize 
that the nature of self-concept is multifaceted in structure.
Cognitive Models of Depression 
Depressive Self-schemas 
Cognitive theories of depression explicitly incorporate the self into their causal 
models. This inclusion affords an examination of how cognitive and affective processes, 
and their interaction with the self, impact on depression. Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery 
(1979) assign particular importance to the influence of cognitive formulations in the 
etiology of depression. Their cognitive distortion theory proposes that depressed 
individuals characteristically hold negative, pessimistic thoughts about the self, their 
current situation, and their future. These negative thoughts are hypothesized to result 
from a specific style of information processing that distorts cognition. The distortions of 
depressed individuals include selective attention to negative, rather than positive, 
information, resulting in inappropriate inferences about their own actions and those of 
others. These distortions represent dysfunctional attitudes that predispose individuals to 
depression (Beck 1967,1976). Furthermore, he stipulates that these dysfunctional 
attitudes are closely associated with a stable and enduring “depressive self-schema”.
Recall that self-schemas exert a significant influence on information-processing by 
guiding selective attention to information (from both external and intemal sources), as 
well as by influencing both the encoding and retrieval of information (Segal & Ingram, 
1994). Accordingly, a depressive self-schema, which guides the perception, evaluation, 
and memory of personally relevant experiences, results in a negatively biased construal
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of the self and environment (Alloy et al., 1997). A depressive self-schema, therefore 
appears to influence both the structure of the self-concept, and the process of self- 
evaluation and subsequent self-esteem.
Evidence for the operation of depressive schemas is offered by Kuiper and 
MacDonald (1982), who examined self-referential processes in college students who 
were either depressed or non-depressed. Enhanced recall of non-depressed content 
material was observed in the non-depressed group, whereas the depressed group showed 
equal recall of depressed and non-depressed content.
Types of Cognition
Ingram (1990) has suggested that cognitive constructs can be differentiated 
according to whether they represent primarily cognitive products (e.g. self-statements), 
cognitive content, cognitive processes (e.g. cognitive vulnerabilities), or cognitive 
structures (e.g. self-schemas). Clarification of different types of cognitions helps to 
understand the mechanisms involved in cognitive models of depression. This is 
particularly important considering that research measures typically assess cognitive 
products, rather than cognitive processes or structures (Segal & Ingram, 1994). The focus 
on measuring cognitive products is potentially misleading, given that cognitive theorists 
predict that improvements in cognitive products occur with remission of depression, but a 
vulnerability to future depressive episodes remains due to trait-like, stable cognitive 
processes or structures that do not improve with remission (Segal, 1988, Ingram,
Miranda, & Segal, 1998).
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Proposed Cognitive Vulnerabilities
Various cognitive vulnerability factors have been proposed within models of 
depression, often targeting different types of cognitions. Ellis’s original theory (1962), as 
well as its most recent iteration in the form of rational-emotive behavioural therapy 
(1994; 1996) posits errors in thinking (i.e., cognitive processes), related to rigid standards 
applied to oneself and others, predispose individuals to experience disappointment and 
become depressed. Although not specific to depression, these irrational beliefs represent 
cognitive vulnerabilities to developing psychological disorders.
Seligman’s reformulated learned helplessness/hopelessness theory (Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989) examines the 
cognitive processes involved when an individual searches for the causes of events. This 
theory postulates that explanations for negative events may be pathological, leading to 
feelings of helplessness and/or hopelessness, which then result in depression. These 
maladaptive interpretations of events are conceptualized as depressogenic attributional 
styles that represent cognitive vulnerabilities. Specifically, predisposition to depression 
occurs by attributing negative events to stable, global and intemal causes, rather than 
interpreting them as transitory, specific to certain situations, or due to extemal, 
environmental factors. Similar to the majority of cognitive models of depression, this 
depressogenic attributional style serves as the casual factor in the development of 
depression.
Carver and Ganellen (1983) advance cognitive processes involving self-punitiveness 
as markers of cognitive vulnerabilities. They note that three specific processes 
predisposed individuals to depression: (a) Holding goals or standards that are too high.
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(b) being especially critical to deviations from these standards, and (c) the tendency to 
generalize from a particular negative event to the overall sense of self-worth.
Beck’s theorizing (1967,1976,1987) on depressive self-schemata shifts the putative 
cause for depression (i.e., vulnerability) to the level of cognitive structures, and the 
content represented within them. Dysfunctional/depressive cognitive schemas predispose 
individuals to experience depression.
Diathesis-Stress Model of Depression 
Despite the different cognitive vulnerabilities advanced by the varied theorists, 
they all can be interpreted within a more complex conception of depression; the 
Diathesis-Stress model. This model places the depressed individual within an 
environmental context. Within this framework, preexisting cognitive vulnerability factors 
(the diathesis) are postulated to contribute to a depressive response to negative life events 
(the stress). Beck’s (1967) original thesis did incorporate these variables, as well as the 
self, by stipulating that, for cognitively vulnerable people, stressful life events precipitate 
a pattern of negative, biased, self-referent information processing that represents the first 
step in the downward cycle of depression. Beck appears to draw a link between cognitive 
processes and structures. The negative content contained within a depressive self-schema 
guides the cognitive processes of the depression prone individual. Nonvulnerable 
individuals, who do not have depressive self-schemata, do not engage in such self- 
deprecating processes and consequently do not become depressed. Attributional styles, 
self-punitiveness, cognitive errors, and other cognitive vulnerabilities are likewise 
proposed to interact with life stress, and collectively represent possible etiological 
predictors of depression.
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Criticisms of Cognitive Models of Depression 
Despite the intuitive appeal of these cognitive accounts for hypothesized causes 
of depression, early research examining these theories was criticized for varied reasons. 
The most striking criticism was that proposed cognitive vulnerabilities became 
undetectable in remitted depressives (Hammen, Miklowitz, & Dyck, 1986; Persons & 
Rao, 1985), which suggested that these dysfunctional attitudes and attributions were 
merely concomitants of depression, not causes. Another early criticism targeted the lack 
of research examining the influence of specific types of stress within the Diathesis-Stress 
model. Methodological concerns were also raised by some theorists related to the 
artificial nature of experimental stimuli. Finally, Stoppard (1989) was vocal in her 
criticism of the cognitive model’s inability to account for observed sex differences in 
rates of depression. Each of these criticisms will be discussed in turn, and current 
approaches to addressing these issues will be reviewed.
Lack of Cognitive Vulnerabilities in Remitted Depressives 
Early empirical support for the Diathesis-Stress model of depression was equivocal 
at best (Showers et al., 1999). Attempts to demonstrate a causal connection between 
cognitive vulnerabilities and depression were generally viewed as unsuccessful (Persons 
& Miranda, 1992; Segal & Ingram, 1994). Although some researchers cited evidence that 
negative cognitions in non-depressed individuals could predict future depressive episodes 
(Hammen, Marks, Mayol & deMayo, 1985; Metalsky, Halberstadt, & Abramson, 1987), 
the majority of research indicated that strong differences in self-schemas were only found 
between depressed and non-depressed persons, with remitted depressives often evincing
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cognitive structures similar to never depressed individuals ( Dobson & Shaw, 1986; 
Kuiper, Olinger, & MacDonald, 1988; Swallow & Kuiper, 1987).
Dobson and Shaw (1986) presented a list of depressed and non-depressed personal 
adjectives to depressed psychiatric, non-depressed psychiatric, and nonpsychiatric 
patients. The depressed group recalled more of the depressed adjectives, and rated them 
as more self-descriptive overall, compared to the other two groups. However, when these 
same participants were retested after remission, they showed no recall bias for the 
depressed adjectives and also rated the non-depressed words as being more self- 
descriptive.
Opponents to the depressive self-schema construct began to discuss the difficulty of 
showing stable cognitive vulnerabilities in remitted depressives (Coyne and Gotlib,
1983). Accordingly, many researchers (Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Carver, La Voie, Kuhl, 
& Ganellen, 1988; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983, 1986; Dobson, 1986) have concluded that 
there are no enduring, stable, depressive schemas. The presence of distorted cognitions or 
negative attributions might merely represent a concomitant to depression, rather than an 
onset vulnerability factor as proposed by the cognitive models. Other researchers 
(Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & Ranklin, 1981) have reversed the causal order 
between a depressive self-schema and depression by proposing the “scar hypothesis” 
which posits that distorted cognitions are a result of a depressive episode.
Reconciling Contradictory Evidence Using Priming Methodology
Segal and Ingram (1994) reconcile contradictory findings related to the causal role of 
cognitions within the Diathesis-Stress model in their seminal article that highlights the 
importance of conceptualizing depressive self-schemas as latent cognitive structures.
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Before the influences of these self-schemas become evident and overtly testable, they 
must first be activated by some type of priming procedure (Kelvin et al., 1999; Segal & 
Ingram, 1994). Priming procedures involve the activation of a hypothetical mental 
structure. Cognitive researchers studying depression typically have examined the 
activation processes of negative, self-referent cognitive structures through the induction 
of a negative mood (Segal & Ingram, 1994). These issues of latency and activation had 
already been discussed by Beck and his colleagues (1979), who stated.
The theory proposes that early experiences provide the basis for forming negative 
concepts about the self.... These ... may be latent but can be activated by specific 
circumstances which are analogous to experiences initially responsible for embedding the 
negative attitude” (p. 16).
In context of the Diathesis-Stress model, negative life events represent the priming 
procedure that activates a depressive self-schema in cognitively vulnerable individuals. 
Segal and Ingram (1994) incorporate the issue of importance by stating that these adverse 
life events will activate cognitive vulnerabilities if they are directly tied to a domain that 
is important to a persons’ sense of self-worth. Latency can explain why there are no 
observable differences in cognitive vulnerabilities between remitted depressives and 
never depressed individuals if they are tested while not experiencing some significant life 
stress.
Although Coyne and Gotlib (1986) further criticized the notion of latent processes 
on the grounds that it “is reducing the possible points of contact between cognitive 
formulations and empirical data” (p. 697), subsequent research has supported the 
inclusion of activation procedures for testing cognitive formulations of depression 
(Kelvin et al., 1999; Teasdale & Dent, 1987; Williams, 1988; unpublished doctoral 
thesis). Teasdale and Dent (1987) report that, after exposure to a negative mood
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induction, a priming procedure which involved reading a series of negatively toned 
statements about the self, remitted depressives recalled more negative adjectives rated as 
self-descriptive compared to women with no history of depression. This finding suggests 
activation of a depressive self-schema in the remitted depressive participants.
Williams’ (1988) prospective study is another early example of research using a 
priming methodology before examining the predictive validity of cognitive 
vulnerabilities. Student participants were induced into either a negative or positive mood 
and then asked to recall positive and negative self-descriptive adjectives. Differential 
recall for negative and positive adjectives in the neutral condition did not predict 
depressive episodes during a one-year follow-up, however, participants who recalled 
more negative than positive self-referent adjectives in the negative mood condition 
experienced more significant episodes of depression. These results support the existence 
of a depressive self-schema, which, if measured after activation, represents a 
vulnerability for depression.
Gotlib (Gotlib & Krasnoperova, 1998) appears to have recently recanted his earlier 
criticism of latent cognitive structures by stating, “based on the results of recent priming 
studies, we argue further that some aspects of cognitive functioning, particularly those 
involving memory processes, may indeed represent vulnerability factors for depression” 
(p. 603). Segal and Ingram (1994) provide direction for future research by suggesting that 
“the key to assessment of cognitive vulnerability is to study the activation of negative 
self-referent cognitive structures” (p. 665).
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Focus on Specific Stressors
Critics also argue that, although cognitive theories of depression incorporate the role 
of environmental stressors in discussions about the etiology of depression, early 
researchers treated the effects of stressful life events in an undifferentiated manner 
(Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Stoppard, 1989). Coyne and Gotlib (1983) argue that cognitive 
research has been limited by a failure to examine how specific types of life stress are 
related to depression. Segal (1988) has also commented on the necessity of further 
refining the interaction between cognitive vulnerabilities and specific life stressors in 
cognitive formulations of depression.
Schemas may be potentially reactive in the face of triggering events or specific 
triggers. A model capable of testing this formulation would need not only to identify the 
individuals who might be characterized by this type of cognitive bias but also to specify 
the nature of the triggering events or circumstances that would activate it (p. 151).
Hammen (1985) had previously answered these valid criticisms by explicitly 
integrating evaluation of stressful events. Hammen, Marks, Mayol and deMayo (1985) 
were the first to test the hypothesized interaction between cognitive vulnerabilities and 
stressful life event characteristics. The significance of this approach is apparent in light 
of their finding that cognitive vulnerability variables, although measured without any 
priming procedures, were predictive of future episodes of depression. This relationship, 
however, only emerged after matching depressive self-schemas with schema-congruent 
negative life events. The importance of examining life stress is made salient by a recent 
analysis of the Canadian National Population Health Survey, conducted in 1994-1995 
(Stephens, Oulberg, & Joubert, 1999). Individuals who reported high, versus low, levels 
of stress were three times more likely to suffer from depressive symptoms and also 
reported lower levels of self-esteem.
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Sociotropv and Autonomy 
Rector, Segal and Gemar’s (1998) review of schema research in depression discusses 
the need for investigation of specific life events that may trigger depression, and they 
offer further support for the multi-dimensional structure of self. Their summary of 
schema research supports Beck’s (1983, 1987) division of the depressive schema 
construct into two major dimensions; sociotropy and autonomy. This conceptual division 
is particularly evident in research that employs self-report inventories to assess 
depressive schemata (Cane, Olinger, Gotlib, & Kuiper, 1986; Clark, Steer, Beck, & Ross, 
1995). Beck (1983) initially discussed these two subtypes as dimensions of personality. 
Sociotropic, or socially dependent, people are typified by there; need to seek closeness 
and reassurance, desire for stable relationships, and a fear of disappointing, or being 
rejected by, others. Any loss of an interpersonal relationship is closely connected to the 
self-esteem of these individuals (Coyne & Whiffen, 1995).
The self-esteem of autonomous individuals, however, is principally derived from 
their sense of self-efficacy, and their ability to achieve their goals. They are concerned 
with individuality, and are typified by; an intemalized set of standards, goals, criteria for 
achievement, and highly specific self-rewards. They often desire a freedom to initiate 
their own aetions, disliking extemally imposed directives, and tends to judge self-worth 
by success in fulfilling specific role expectations. Other characteristics of the autonomous 
personality include being less susceptible to extemal feedback, which likely overlaps 
with their lack of sensitivity to the needs of others (Beck, 1983).
This last autonomy descriptor, which downplays the importance of monitoring 
interpersonal relationships for autonomous individuals, would appear to reflect a
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contradictory nature between these two personality dimensions. Although Beck (1983) 
argued for the existence of “pure cases” (p. 272) -  representing a heavy predominance for 
one of these domains he also theorized that individuals can shift between their 
sociotropic and autonomous tendencies, depending upon the environmental context. In 
essence, Beck (1983) was setting the stage for later schema-congruency theorizing.
A strict typological approach involving mutual exclusivity of sociotropy and 
autonomy dimensions has also been challenged by Coyne and Whiffen (1995), who 
review research suggesting that individuals reporting high levels of both sociotropy and 
autonomy are; clinically depressed more often (Klein, Harding, Taylor, & Dickstein,
1988), experience higher levels of depression (Blatt, Guinlan, Chevron, McDonald, & n. They
conclude their review by questioning “whether they (sociotropy and autonomy) should be 
considered distinct characteristics rather than facets of a more basic personality 
characteristic” (p. 362, italics added).
Despite evidence suggesting that sociotropy and autonomy are not entirely 
independent constructs, researchers continue to investigate the congruency hypothesis; 
which predicts that specific cognitive vulnerabilities will interact with specific life events 
(see Dozois & Backs-Dermott, 2000, for a review). A consistent finding in this area of 
study is that measures of sociotropy successfully predict negative reactions to 
interpersonal difficulties, yet the autonomy construct often lacks predictive utility for
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responses to achievement dilemmas. Dozois and Backs-Dermott (2000) propose that this 
discrepancy may be associated with convergent validity concems among measures used 
to assess autonomy, which are not present for measures of sociotropy. Despite the current 
difficulties to uncover a predictive link for autonomy, the conceptualization of depressive 
schemata with distinct content domains (i.e., achievement and interpersonal) allows for 
more refined investigation of the interaction between specific personal events (i.e., 
failure, loss of relationships) and the onset of depression.
A Call for Ecologically Valid Experiments 
Another topic argued to require refinement within cognitive research on depression 
is the use of appropriate experimental stimuli that better approximate the way self­
referent information is stored in semantic memory (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Segal, 1988). 
The adequacy of trait adjectives, varying in personal descriptiveness, as representative 
measures of self-schemas has been questioned. Although studies employing trait 
adjectives have been lauded for their experimental control, they have also been criticized 
for lacking relevance to real world issues (Neisser, 1976). To address this area of 
concem, critics have called for experimental methods that better capture the process of 
personal evaluation outside the laboratory (Safran, Segal, Hill, & Whiffen, 1990; Segal, 
1988).
Clarifying Gender Differences in Depression Rates 
Finally, Stoppard (1989) has argued that cognitive theories of depression are 
inherently flawed for they do not account for the higher rates of depression observed 
among women. This criticism focuses specifically on the failure to find gender 
differences on measures of cognitive vulnerabilities (Dobson & Breiter, 1983; Oliver &
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Baumgart, 1983), or the antithetic findings that males hold greater cognitive 
vulnerabilities (Gotlib, 1984; Wise & Bames, 1986). Numerous theorists of varied 
backgrounds have responded to this criticism (Costello, 1989; Dobson, 1989; Gotlib, 
1989; Pyke & Toukmanian; Hammen, 1989; Moretti & Meichenbaum, 1989; Nezu & 
Nezu, 1989; Olinger, 1989; Shaw, 1989). The main rejoinders to Stoppard’s criticism 
involved reviews of the literature that suggested, (a) greater cognitive vulnerabilities in 
women (Gotlib, 1989), (b) discussion of the lack of sex differences in depression rates 
among college students, which represent the majority of experimental samples reviewed 
by Stoppard (Hammen, 1989; Morettie & Meichenbaum, 1989), and (c) an 
acknowledgement of the potential causal heterogeneity of depression (Costello, 1989).
Olinger (1989) also advanced the argument that a lack of sex differences in cognitive 
vulnerabilities does not necessarily invalidate the Diathesis-Stress model if you accept 
the proposition that women may experience more life stress. The more recent emphasis 
on the necessity of activating latent cognitive vulnerabilities represents an additional 
explanation for the discrepancy between gender depression rates and levels of cognitive 
vulnerabilities. Perhaps women are more cognitively predisposed to experience 
depression, but these vulnerabilities must first be primed before sex differences emerge.
Measures of Cognitive Vulnerability
Researchers have developed a number of measures to assess the various cognitive 
vulnerabilities proposed by theorists. The Attributional Styles Questionnaire (ASQ; 
Peterson, Semmel, Von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982) was based on 
the reformulated leamed helplessness theory of depression and examines the causal 
explanations individuals make for negative events. The Cognitive Bias Questionnaire
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(CBQ; Hammen, 1981) draws upon Beck’s theories (1967, 1976) to measure cognitive 
distortions such as the tendency to overgeneralize the implications of unpleasant events 
and the tendency to make inferences without considering alternative points of view. The 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978) also tests postulates from 
Beck’s cognitive distortion theory related to making erroneous inferences, attending to 
negative stimuli, and overgeneralizing from negative events. Janoff-Bulman (1979) 
created a measure that taps into behavioral self-blame, which involves self-criticism of 
behavior, as well as characterological self-blame, which involves self-criticism related to 
the type of person one is. Janoff-Bulman’s research (1979) suggests that depressed 
people engage in higher levels of characterological self-blame, but they do not differ 
from non-depressed people on the behavioral self-blame variable. Carver and Ganellen’s 
Attitude Towards Self Scale (ATS; 1983) also assesses self-punitiveness through 
measurement of high standards, self-criticism, and overgeneralization.
The overgeneralization construct represents a common cognitive process associated 
with depression. Carver, Ganellen, and Behar-Mitrani (1985) argue that although the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire, Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, and the Attitudes 
Towards Self scale offer differing theoretical antecedents, they all contain elements or 
subscales that reflect a tendency to look at a specific bad outcome and infer an overall 
lack of self-worth. Overgeneralization has been offered as a mechanism that explains the 
interaction between self-esteem and depression, and further articulation of the construct is 
warranted. Considerable evidence indicates that depressed individuals, as well as those 
with low self-esteem, tend to exhibit a selective bias to overgeneralize the implications of 
unfavorable outcomes towards the self (Carver & Ganallen, 1983; Carver et al., 1985;
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Kemis et al., 1989). Recall that this psychological process is incorporated as a potential 
diathesis in Beck’s earliest writings (1967); he postulates that the depressed person’s 
sense of failure spreads “from the particular trait to the totality of his self-concept” (p. 
115).
There also appears to be a close connection between the definitions of 
overgeneralization and depressive self-schemas. Carver, Ganellen, and Behar-Mitrani 
(1985) have defined overgeneralization as “the degree to which bad outcomes engage a 
tendency to bring thoughts of personal inadequacy to mind and/or experience a reduction 
in the sense of self-worth” (p. 727). A reiteration of the depressive self-schema definition, 
“a cognitive structure comprised of self-descriptive traits or attributes which are 
represented in an organized or clustered fashion in semantic memory, such that activation 
or exposure to one attribute will automatically lead to activation of the others” (Segal & 
Vella, 1990; p. 162), suggests that the cognitive process of overgeneralization is akin to 
activating the cognitive structure contained within depressive self-schemas.
Research on Overgeneralization Measures
Considerable research supports the validity of the overgeneralization subscale, from 
the Attitudes Towards Self Scale, as a robust measure, which is both correlated with, and 
predictive of, depression (Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Carver, Ganellen, & Behar-Mitrani, 
1985; Carver, La Voie, Kuhl, & Ganellen, 1988; Edelman, Ahrens, & Haaga, 1994; Flett, 
Hewitt, & Mittelstaedt, 1991; Ganellen, 1988; Kemis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989). 
Furthermore, research using other measures of overgeneralization has shown that this 
constmct can account for significant variance in depressive symptomatology (Fpstein, 
1992). Carver and Ganellen (1983) report that the overgeneralization subscale from the
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ATS accounted for 17.5% of the variance in Beck Depression Inventory scores (EDI; 
Beck, 1967) amongst both male and female college students. However, the other 
subscales of the Attitudes Towards Self scale, measuring self-criticism and high 
standards, did not account for substantive variance. Carver and colleagues (1985) later 
demonstrated through partial correlation analyses that the overgeneralization subscale of 
the Attitudes Towards Self scale was a better predictor of Beck Depression Inventory 
scores than the Cognitive Bias Questionnaire, Attributional Style Questionnaire, and the 
Janoff-Bulman measure of characterological self-blame.
Ganellen (1988) reexamined the predictive validity of the ATS Overgeneralization 
subscale and the Attributional Style Questionnaire for depression scores measured by the 
Hamilton Rating Scales for Depression (HRSD; Hamiltion, 1960). Results confirmed 
earlier research indicating that the Overgeneralization subscale was a more robust 
predictor of depression than attributional style. Furthermore, the Overgeneralization 
subscale demonstrated specificity for depression, and was not correlated with anxiety, 
whereas the Attributional Style Questionnaire tended to covary with both depression and 
anxiety. This finding answers the criticism of Coyne and Gotlib (1983), who argued that 
specificity to depression had not been demonstrated consistently for any measure of 
cognitive bias or distortion. These results suggested that the process of self-evaluation 
following negative life stress might be more relevant to depression, compared to the 
explanations related to the causes of such events.
Edelman, Ahrens, and Haaga (1994) also cite evidence from a prospective study 
supporting the superior validity of the ATS overgeneralization subscale, relative to the 
Attributional Style Quesionnaire. Stable, global attributions for positive events tended to
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predict recovery in a 3-week follow-up assessment for individuals who were initially 
dysphoric, inferring that positive self-descriptions from the occurrence of positive events 
were associated with more subsequent remission in depressive symptoms. 
Overgeneralization, however, predicted more subsequent depression, with high 
overgeneralizers remaining more dysphoric at the 3-week follow-up than individuals who 
did not overgeneralize. Of particular significance is the fact that this study focused on 
exploring attributional styles and only included the ATS scale as an exploratory measure.
Epstein’s (1992) research included self-reference as a variable in a study that 
examined generalizations from positive and negative events among groups of subjects 
differing in general coping ability. Results indicated that groups differed only in response 
to negative outcomes directed at the self (rather than others), with more negative 
overgeneralization occurring among poor constructive thinkers. These findings further 
supported the role of negative self-schemas; specifically the process of making negative 
inferences about the self, for self-esteem and depression.
Priming Overgeneralization
Similar to the difficulties of establishing a depressive self-schema as a causal 
determinant of low self-esteem and depression, early research suggested a concomitant 
function for overgeneralization rather than a causal one. Using a cross-lag correlation 
design, researchers (Carver et al., 1988) tested a unidirectional causal connection between 
overgeneralization and depression but found no evidence for such a link. Contradictory 
evidence is obtained in research reported by Edelman and colleagues (1994), who found a 
causal link between overgeneralization tendencies and abatement/maintenance of 
depressive symptoms.
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Reconciliation of these discrepant conclusions once again requires consideration of 
the latency argument. Overgeneralization measurements in the latter study were 
completed on dysphoric individuals suggesting that this cognitive vulnerability was in an 
active, and therefore primed state. Participants in the Carver et al. (1988) study, however, 
were non-depressed and no priming procedures were employed. Studies that account for 
the interaction between cognition and environmental variables (i.e., life events) through 
the use of priming procedures are argued to be more ecologically valid than paradigms 
that do not prime self-schemas before testing (Safran et al., 1990).
Conceptual Framework Linking Self-esteem and Depression 
How should one conceptualize the framework linking negative life events, 
overgeneralization, self-esteem reactivity, and depression? To establish causality, both 
overgeneralization and self-esteem reactivity must be shown to be temporally and 
conceptually independent of depression. Roberts, Gotlib, and Kassel (1996) advance an 
ordering of these variables by arguing that dysfunctional attitudes (cognitive 
vulnerabilities) predispose people to lower levels of self-esteem. Subsequently, “depleted 
levels of self-esteem then act as a more proximal cause of depressive symptoms” (p. 316- 
317). This conception is supported by the realization that the majority of cognitive 
models of depression incorporate, either implicitly or explicitly, the causal effect of self­
esteem reactivity. Recall that negative biases (i.e., information processing associated with 
depressive self-schemas and cognitive vulnerabilities) lead to decreases in self-esteem 
through disparaging thoughts of personal competency (Kemis et al., 1998).
Do self-esteem fluctuations and overgeneralization represent moderating variables 
between negative life events and development of depression? This would appear to
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depend upon the exact model and variables being investigated. Edelman and colleagues 
(1994) indicated that overgeneralization moderated the remittance of depressive 
symptoms among dysphoric individuals. Similarly, self-esteem fluctuations were shown 
to moderate the impact of stressful life events on depression symptoms over a 6-week 
prospective interval (Roberts & Gotlib, 1997). Both overgeneralization and low self­
esteem were argued to play a mediating role, however, between adult attachment security 
and depressive symptoms (Roberts, Gotlib, & Kassel, 1996). Adding to the confusion of 
appropriate modeling is the consideration that two of these studies were conducted by the 
same researchers. It is the current author’s opinion that, due to the complexity of 
arguments surrounding potential ontological determinants of depression, it would be 
somewhat simplistic to assume that a single causal mechanism results in depression. 
Therefore, overgeneralization and self-esteem reactivity are best conceptualized as 
moderating variables.
Another logical question pertinent to developing an appropriate model asks whether 
self-esteem and overgeneralization represent redundant measures for predicting 
depression. Kemis and colleagues (1998) employed a prospective experimental design to 
examine the roles of self-esteem variability and overgeneralization (measured using the 
Attitude Towards Self scale) in the context of daily life hassles and severity of depressive 
symptoms. Results indicated that both of these variables accounted for independent 
variance in depression. This observed lack of redundancy further supports the notion that 
self-esteem and overgeneralization act as moderators within conceptual models of 
depression.
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Integration of various theories and research reviewed allows for the development of 
a conceptual model that argues for a causal role of self-esteem reactivity in the 
development of depression (refer to Figure 2). Negative life events that directly reference 
a person’s sense of self function as stressors that interact with an individual’s tendency to 
overgeneralize (cognitive process). This interaction activates latent, depressive self­
schemata (cognitive structures) among people with a tendency to overgeneralize. 
Depressive self-schemata then bias memory recall of important self-evaluations 
(cognitive products), which is assessed as fluctuations in self-esteem (i.e., self- 
evaluations for self-concept domains considered important). These fluctuations 
exacerbate and prolong negative affect and subsequently lead to depression. Individuals 
who do not overgeneralize from negative events do not activate negative self-schemas 
and are hypothesized to be somewhat protected from reactive self-esteem and depression.
Activation of Latent Cognitive Structures; Mood-state versus Cognitive-priming 
Although there is sufficient agreement that depressive self-schemas must first be 
activated before their effects are observed, disagreement currently exists over the specific 
mechanism, mood or cognition, by which these latent cognitive structures are primed (see 
Blaney, 1986 for a review; Brown & Taylor, 1986).
Bower’s Associative Network Model 
Bower’s (1981) associative network model provides a framework for understanding 
how thoughts and/or feelings could prime latent, depressive schemas. Bower proposes 
that both cognitive and affective information is represented within semantic memory as a 
network of tightly interconnected nodes. Spreading activation is hypothesized to occur 
after the adjacent nodes become indirectly primed and activated due to their proximity to














Figure 2. Conceptual framework for Diathesis-Stress model
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nodes that are directly targeted. Accordingly, nodes within this associative network that 
are closely located, or have a history of being indirectly primed, are more likely to 
respond to spreading activation in the future. Similar to neuronal pathways in the brain, 
networks of connected nodes that are activated more frequently may become stronger and 
more automatic, and, arguably, may have a lower threshold for activation. Thus, 
depressive cognitive structures will likely become salient through their associative 
relationship with negative cognitions and affect engendered by current, negative life 
events (Segal & Ingram, 1994).
Disagreement exists amongst researchers on whether subjectively negative mood- 
states or negative cognitions activate the series of nodes within the associative network 
that comprise the depressive self-schema. The mood-state hypothesis (Miranda & Gross, 
1997; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998) predicts that because depressive schemas are likely to 
develop in a negative emotional context, they should be linked to the associated 
depressed mood within this memory network. Accordingly, derogatory self-evaluations 
do not occur until cued by the reemergence of their associated mood-state. Negative 
moods should trigger the activation of latent, depressive schemas, which in turn promote 
instability of self-esteem and subsequent depression (Kelvin et al., 1999; Teasdale, 1988).
Bower’s (1981) early research supported the mood-state-dependent memory, 
learning, and behaviour theory. The cognitive-priming perspective, however, posits that 
MIPs that make reference to the self prime valenced cognitive structures independent of 
their effects on mood (Slyker & McNally, 1991; Riskind, 1989) and it is the cognitive 
aspect of the procedure that influences people’s self-evaluations (Blaney, 1986).
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Both cognition and emotion have been incorporated into conceptions of the self. 
Although the majority of theorists and researchers favour a cognitive conception of the 
self, some have recognized the role of affect, specifically tied to the process of evaluation 
and self-esteem, in the structure and processes of the self-concept. Although James 
(1890) did not directly discuss the role of emotion, he did view the self in terms of both a 
cognitive and evaluative system. Cooley (1902) incorporated self-feeling as an important 
component in his theory of self. Markus’s incorporation of self-schemas relies heavily on 
the cognitive components of the self, yet she places the self-concept within a system of 
affective-cognitive structures (Markus & Nurius, 1986).
Mood Induction Procedure Paradigm 
Research examining mood-state and cognitive-priming theories often employ mood 
induction procedures (MIPs), which are designed to create temporary mood states 
analogous to naturally occurring moods (Martin, 1990). Initial support for the mood- 
priming perspective was obtained from studies in which memories that were affectively 
congruent with an induced mood-state were also found to be more accessible (Snyder & 
White, 1982; Teasdale & Taylor, 1981). These results are also interpretable within the 
cognitive-priming perspective; MIPs used in these studies required participants to read 
positive and negative statements directly targeting the self, which allowed participants 
greater access to similarly toned memories.
To clarify the primacy of cognition or emotion, Rholes, Riskind and Lane (1987) 
examined the factor of self-reference in MIP effects. Although somatic statements that 
encouraged participants to adopt bodily sensations associated with depression were as 
efficacious as self-devaluative statements for inducing a negative mood, access to
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emotional memories was only facilitated by the latter. Furthermore, the self-devaluative 
statements were shown to promote access to these memories even when they failed to 
decrease mood. Heatherton, Striepe, and Wittenberg (1998) developed an alternative 
methodology to investigate the role of self-reference in MIP effects. Their MIPs required 
dieters to either focus on themselves (self-referent) or another person (other-referent) as 
the cause of a positive or neutral event. These researchers report that only the negative, 
self-referent MIP resulted in disruption of participants’ dietary restraint.
The current author adapted this MIP methodology from previous research (Taylor, 
1999) that investigated body image esteem, which can be conceptualized as a specific 
domain of self-concept. Participants exposed to a positive, self-referent MIP failed to 
report a mood change, yet their body esteem improved, suggesting support for the 
cognitive-priming hypothesis over mood-state. This trend was also supported for the 
negative MIPs; although the negative self-referent and other-referent MIPs both produced 
significant decreases in affect, women in the self-referent condition reported more 
derogatory body esteem, whereas women in the other-referent MIP unexpectedly 
reported improvement in body esteem. These results demonstrate that mood can be 
incongruent with self-evaluation. Safran et al., (1990) explain that the mood versus 
cognition controversy is still debated in the literature, arguing that “the question as to 
whether schematic processing differences merely reflect the effects of mood, rather than 
the operation of a cognitive structure, has yet to be conclusively resolved” (p. 145).
Central versus Peripheral Self-concept
Sedikides (1995) further examined the emotion versus cognition primacy issue by 
incorporating Kelly’s (1955) notion of core and peripheral descriptions of self. According
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to Sedikides differential sensitivity hypothesis, central and peripheral^ self-conceptions 
are differentially influenced by mood. Peripheral self-conceptions are modified in a 
mood-congruent manner because they are less elaborated and less certain, whereas 
central self-conceptions are unaffected by mood because they are more elaborated and 
certain. Sedikides (1995) research supports the differential sensitivity hypothesis because 
peripheral self-conceptions (behavior and trait self-descriptive adjectives rated as 
irrelevant to the self) showed a congruency with induced happy and sad mood-states. 
Central self-conceptions (behavior and trait self-descriptive adjectives rated as personally 
relevant to the self) however, showed stability and lack of change related to mood.
The issue of self-reference becomes salient for placing these results in context, for 
Sedikides employed a story MIP that focused on an extemal other. This other-referent 
MIP was used for the explicitly stated purpose of avoiding the possibility of confounding 
between the effects of mood and the potential impact of cognition related to the self. 
Would the differential sensitivity hypothesis hold for MIPs that target the self, as opposed 
to an extemal other? The significance of this question is illustrated by the research of 
Hoh, McLennan, and Ho (1987) who studied attributional styles and their correlation to 
depressive symptoms. Although only the intemality attribution was predictive of 
depression scores, the importance that participants assigned to the bad events of the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire was also significant. Researchers interpreted this 
finding as support for a depressive self-schema in that subjects’ depression scores were 
significantly related to their tendency to view potential negative events as having greater 
self-referent importance.
 ̂Sedikides (1995) defines central self-conceptions as high in personal descriptiveness and importance, 
whereas peripheral self-conceptions are low in personal descriptiveness and importance.
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Demand Characteristics 
A limitation inherent to the majority of experimental research is the issue of 
demand characteristics (Ome, 1962). This concern is heightened for investigations 
employing an MIP paradigm (Polivy & Doyle, 1980), as well as the use of self-report 
measures. With respect to MIPs that use emotionally toned self-statements, critics have 
argued that genuine mood induction may not occur and participants are simply reporting 
mood change to comply with experimental demands (Polivy & Doyle, 1980).
Polivy and Doyle (1980) examined the inherent demand effects associated with 
Velten’s (1968) original mood induction procedure instructions to “try and feel the mood 
suggested by” the self-referent statements. These researchers included counter-demand 
groups with participants who were instructed that they could expect to feel the opposite 
mood suggested by the self statements. Although the participants in these counter­
demand groups did not experience any significant mood shift, suggesting that demand 
effects have an impact on participant responses, Polivy and Doyle conclude that demand 
characteristics contribute to genuine mood changes.
The potential confound of demand characteristics also apply to story MIPs that 
encourage participants to allow themselves to feel the mood associated with the story. 
Evidence refuting the demand-effects proposal is the observation of mood effects that 
participants are unlikely to spontaneously produce (Martin, 1990). For example, 
differences in conjugate eye movements between negative and positive self-statement 
MIP groups have been observed (Natale & Gur, 1980). The speed of psychomotor tasks 
offers further evidence for genuine mood shifts, for participants have shown a decrease in 
number-writing tasks after exposure to a negative self-statement MIP, compared to an
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increase in task speed after a positive self-statement MIP (Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi, 
1981).
The argument that only demand characteristics account for MIP effects is 
particularly weak for recall experiments (Martin, 1990), which represent a substantial 
proportion of the research reviewed here. Demand effects can not explain why 
participants who recalled more depressive self-descriptive adjectives than positive ones 
after a negative MIP were more likely to later experience depression (Williams, 1988). 
Demand effects also do not explain the complex interaction of core and peripheral self­
descriptions with mood (Sedikides, 1995). Although evidence suggests that MIPs 
produce genuine shifts in mood, this finding does not negate the possibility that demand 
characteristics do operate within these experiments. The most common solution advanced 
by researchers (Poloivy & Doyle, 1980; Westermann et ah, 1996) is to include a post- 
experimental questionnaire to determine if participants understood the purpose of the 
experiment, and whether they acted in a genuine fashion or were attempting to behave 
like “good participants”. Suspicious participants can then be excluded from data analysis.
Social Comparison Theory 
Explanations for the unexpected improvement in body esteem observed after 
exposure to a negative, other-focused MIP (Taylor, 1999) relied on social comparison 
theory (Festinger, 1954). The majority of social comparison research conducted in the 
area of depression examines how depressed individuals tend to make less favorable 
comparisons during personal performance appraisals and self-evaluations (Ahrens, 1991; 
Brewin & Fumham, 1986; Campbell, 1986). Flett, Hewitt, & Mittelstaedt (1991 p. 214) 
argue that this tendency to perceive negative social comparison outcomes represents
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another form of self-punitiveness. However, there may be a more benign element to 
social comparison, in that researchers have also argued that downward social 
comparisons (comparing oneself to those doing worse than the self) may have self­
enhancing effects that positively influence self-evaluations (Aspinwall, & Taylor, 1993; 
Buunk, Collins, Talor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990). Accordingly, the body image 
attitudes of participants in the Taylor (1999) study may have improved due to downward 
comparisons with the character in the negative, other-referent MIP, who had been badly 
burned in a car accident. The fact that body image is consistently rated as the most 
important self-concept domain among young adult females (Marsh, 1986) suggests that 
this construct represents a central domain of self. Would these social comparison trends 
emerge for self-evaluations in peripheral domains of self-concept?
The relationship between self-esteem and social comparisons represents another area 
of controversy. Some theorists (Wills, 1981) argue that individuals with low self-esteem 
are more likely to be self-serving in their use of social comparisons. Other investigators 
(Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987) however, hypothesize that people 
with high self-esteem are more likely to engage in self-enhancing comparisons. Empirical 
research (Buunk et al., 1990) appears to support the latter argument, for individuals with 
low self-esteem were more likely to perceive both downward and upward comparisons as 
having negative implications for the self. Again, would self-esteem differences in social 
comparisons be moderated by the importance ascribed to the self-concept domains being 
compared?
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Rationale and Overview for the Current Study 
The main postulate of the Diathesis-Stress model contends that depression is 
produced by the interaction between cognitive vulnerabilities and the experience of 
stressful life events that are linked to the person’s self-worth (Alloy et al., 1997). 
Individuals at risk for depression are said to hold maladaptive cognitive structures 
(depressive self-schema) which, when activated by negative life events, lead to the 
development of depressive symptoms through their influence on preferential encoding 
and retrieval of negative self-referent information (Alloy et al., 1997). The specific 
mechanisms that lead to the activation of depressive self-schemas (mood vs. cognition), 
the moderating role of cognitive vulnerabilities used to assess these schemas, and the 
moderating effect of importance of self-concept domains on self-esteem reactivity, 
represent current areas of dispute for the Diathesis-Stress model of depression. The 
specific purpose of the present study was to determine whether self-reference, 
overgeneralization, and the importance ascribed to self-concept domains, influence self­
esteem reactivity to MIPs.
To examine these issues, participants’ self-evaluations for various self-concept 
domains were measured before (pre-test) and after (post-test) exposure to one of four 
mood induction procedures (MIPs) that varied in both mood tone (positive vs. negative) 
and degree of self-reference (self-referent vs. other-referent).
Hypotheses
1. Differences in self-evaluation changes for the various self-concept domains, from pre- 
MIP to post-MIP, were hypothesized to occur across the four MIP conditions and will be
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moderated by the importance ratings ascribed to them. These changes are based on the 
following rationale;
a) Self-evaluations in self-concept domains rated as important signify central
characteristics of the self, and therefore are directly related to self-esteem. Derived from 
the cognitive-priming perspective, central self-evaluations were expected to decrease 
after the negative, self-referent MIP, which was designed to hold direct implications for 
an individuals’ sense of self.
Conversely, since the negative, other-referent MIP was designed to avoid self­
focused attention, central self-evaluations were not expected to decrease after this 
condition. Rather, based on social comparison theory and earlier research by Taylor 
(1999), who found body-image esteem improved among women exposed to a similar 
negative, other-referent MIP, central self-evaluations in the current study were expected 
to improve after the negative-other MIP.
b) Self-evaluations in self-concept domains rated as unimportant signify peripheral 
characteristics of the self and are unrelated to self-esteem. These unimportant self 
domains can be understood to exist outside one’s sense of self. Accordingly, mood cues 
alone will influence the self-evaluation process, rather than primed self-schemata. As 
such, peripheral self-evaluations were expected to decrease after both negative MIP 
conditions, and to increase after both positive MIP conditions, consistent with the mood- 
state theory.
c) Based on previous findings of asymmetric effects in self-esteem fluctuations 
associated with success and failure MIPs, it was predicted that observed changes in self­
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evaluations would be more pronounced for the negative MIP conditions compared to the 
positive MIP conditions.
2. The cognitive vulnerability of overgeneralization was expected to moderate observed 
changes, with high overgeneralizers showing greater decreases in central self-evaluations 
after exposure to the negative, self-referent MIP. Since this MIP involves reading 
negatively toned self-statements, it was predicted that individuals with a tendency to 
ruminate on personal failures would be more affected, and demonstrate larger self- 
evaluation decreases across their important domains of self.





Participants were recruited through the University of Windsor undergraduate 
psychology participant pool and received partial course credit for their participation. An 
undergraduate population within an 18-24 age range was deemed appropriate because the 
identity of these students is in a process of change (Marsh, 1986). Thus, their self- 
evaluations may be more prone to fluctuate in response to the mood induction procedures 
(MIPs). All participants provided “informed” written consent prior to completing the 
pretest/screening and the experimental phases, and they were treated in accordance with 
ethical principles for research with human subjects.
Participants were seen on two occasions, during the pretest-screening phase and 
again 7-14 days later during the experimental phase. During the pretest/screening phase, 
212 participants completed the package of questionnaires; 155 (73%) were female. Two 
of these participants were excluded from completing the experimental phase because 
their age fell outside the 18 -  24 yr-old inclusion range. Nine males and nine females (8% 
of pretest/ screening sample) reported high levels of depressive symptoms (scores greater 
than 22 on the Beck Depression Inventory-II [Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996]) at the 
pretest/screening phase and were excluded from the experimental phase. Although BDI- 
II scores of 20 and greater are typically representative of elevated depressive symptoms, 
due to concerns of obtaining a significant sample size to appropriately test hypotheses, a 
slightly higher cut-off score was employed for the present study.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
Elevated depression scores were treated as an exclusionary criterion for three 
reasons. First, it would be unethical to expose currently depressed individuals to a 
negative mood induction procedure. Second, currently depressed individuals will be 
excluded to minimize potential confounding effects of clinical depression on measures of 
self-concept, self-esteem and efficacy of the MIPs. This exclusionary rationale has been 
followed in past depressogenic schema research (Kelvin et al., 1999). Roberts and Gotlib 
(1996), who also examined self-esteem reactivity in non-depressed individuals, cogently 
argue for the validity of using this homogenous sample, “Because we have opted for a 
sample based on low depression scores there should be reduced variance in the 
depression levels and, therefore, this study will provide a conservative test of our 
hypotheses and any positive findings will testify to the potential strength of our model” 
(p. 522). Third, researchers (Roberts & Monroe, 1992) have argued that the effects of 
variability in self-esteem are more pronounced in non-depressed individuals.
Eleven participants failed to retum to complete the experimental phase, and data 
from two participants who did retum were discarded due to deviation from experimental 
procedures. Of the 179 participants who correctly completed the experimental phase, 128 
(72%) were female. Mean age of participants completing the experimental phase was 
20.7 years (SD = 1.5), and the mean depression score was 8.9 (SD = 5.7).
Experimental Design 
This study used a 2 x 2 (between-subj ects) x 2 (within-subjects) mixed factorial 
design with one covariate (depression). The first independent between-subj ects variable, 
mood (positive vs. negative), was crossed with the second between-subj ects variable, 
referent (self vs. other) to produce four groups that represent the four mood induction
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procedures (MIPs); positive-self, positive-other, negative-self, and negative-other. Time 
(pretest vs. posttest) represents the within-subjects independent variable. Figure 3 shows 
the four experimental conditions and their respective sample sizes split by sex at posttest.
Group Assignment
The experimental phase involved random assignment of participants, using random 
number tables, to one of four experimental MIP conditions, with the constraint of equal 
proportions of males and females in each condition.
Measures
Beck Depression Inventory- II (BDI-II)
The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) was included as a screening measure to 
exclude individuals reporting elevated depressive symptoms from completing the 
experimental manipulation. The BDI-II has well established internal consistency, 
Cronbach’s alpha “r”=.84, and good test-retest reliabilities (.60-.83). Concurrent and 
construct validity of the BDI-II with other measures of depression have also been 
reported (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988; Dozois & Dobson, 2001).
Attitudes Toward Self Scale (ATS) -  Overgeneralization Subscale 
The Overgeneralization subscale of the Attitude Towards Self Scale (Carver & 
Ganellen, 1983; see Appendix A) was included as a continuous independent variable that 
could be dichotomized into high and low categories. This subscale contains 7 items that 
measure the tendency for negative outcomes to activate other feelings of personal 
inadequacy in domains that may be unrelated to the initial stressor (e.g., “My feelings 
about myself drop if I notice any weaknesses or shortcomings”). Items are rated on a 7- 
point Likert-type scale (I very strongly agree to I very strongly disagree). Carver et al..








n = 44 n = 46
(13 males\ 31 females) (13 males\ 33 females)
Positive-Other Negative-Other
n = 43 n = 46
(12 males\ 31 females) (13 males\ 33 females)
Figure 3. Four experimental mood induction procedures
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(1985) report a test-retest correlation of .65 for the overgeneralization subscale (6- 
week interval). Carver and Ganellen (1983) report an internal consistency of .80 for this 
subscale. The subscale’s validity is supported by its significant associations (“r” ranging 
from .36 to .64) with the BDI across varied samples (Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Edelman 
et al., 1994; Flett, Hewitt, & Mittelstaedt, 1991; Kemis et al., 1989). Ganellen (1988) 
investigated the discriminant validity of this subscale and reported that it is specifically 
associated with depression, but not anxiety.
Visual Analogue Scales (VAS)
Participants reported their current mood-state by rating the adjectives “happy” and 
“sad” on a scale anchored at 0 mm, {not at all), and 100 mm, {extremely). Six filler 
items, depicting other mood-states, were included to reduce demand characteristics 
associated with this manipulation check. The validity of visual analogue scales (VAS, 
see Appendix B) for assessing mood change has been established in previous studies (see 
Martin, 1990, for a review).
Depressive Adjectives Checklist (DACL)
The DACL, forms A and B (see Appendices C and D, respectively), was used as a 
mood manipulation check to assess the efficacy of the four MIP conditions for altering 
mood. In a meta-analysis study of mood induction research, reviewers concluded that the 
DACL was an effective method for measuring both negative and positive transient mood- 
states (Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). This measure has shown good 
reliability with split-half correlations of “r”= .89 and “r”=.91 for forms A and B 
respectively (Lubin, 1965). These measures have also shown concurrent validity with
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BDI scores drawn from a clinical sample; “r”=.59 for Form A and “r” = .47 for Form B 
(Lubin, 1965). Forms A and B are highly intercorrelated at “r” = .89.
Self Description Questionnaire -  III (SDQ-III)
The Self Description Questionnaire-Ill (Marsh, 1989; see Appendix E) is designed to 
measure multiple dimensions of self-concept in university students and other adults. The 
SDQ-III is composed of 136 self-report items that are structured on an 8-point Likert- 
type response format. The items comprise 13 subscales: eight non-academic subscales 
(Peer Relations -  Same Sex, Peer Relations -  Opposite Sex, Parent Relations, Physical 
Ability, Physical Appearance, Emotional Stability, Honesty/trust, and Spiritual 
Values/Religion); four academic subscales (Verbal, Mathematics, Problem Solving, and 
General -  Academic); and one global measure of self-concept (General-Self).
This self-concept measure was selected for three reasons. First, the 
multidimensional model of self-concept, upon which the SDQ-III is based, has received 
strong empirical support (Byme, 1996 for a review; Harter, 1996). Second, previous 
research (Marsh, Richards, & Bames, 1986) has examined stability coefficients, which 
are correlations between responses to the self-concept subscales by the same individual at 
two points in time. Stability coefficients for SDQ-III subscales, assessed before and after 
a month-long intensive intervention program designed to enhance self-concept/self­
esteem in late adolescents, ranged from “r” = .74-.9S, with a mean “r” = .85. This 
normative data provides a reference for inferring clinically significant change in self- 
concept domains. Third, extensive research across varied samples supports the reliability, 
validity and generalizability of the measure. Internal consistencies for the subscales are 
good (.76 to .95) with a mean Cronbach’s alpha over the 13 subscales of .90 (Marsh,
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1992). The measure has good test-retest reliability (mean subscale “r” = .87) over a one- 
month interval (Marsh, 1986). Application of a multitrait-multimethod approach offers 
support for both convergent and discriminant validity of the SDQ-III (Marsh & Byme,
1993). The factor stracture of the SDQ-III has been validated by confirmatory factor 
analysis and, importantly for the present study, this factor stmcture is invariant across 
gender (Byme, 1988; Marsh, 1989). The SDQ-III also requires individuals to rate the 
personal importance of their self-concept domains (see Appendix F).
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups during the pretest/screening phase. After 
completing consent form A (see Appendix G), followed by the VAS, the participants 
filled out the ATS Overgeneralization subscale and SDQ-III in counterbalanced order. 
The BDI -II was completed last by all participants. After completion of the 
questionnaires, participants scoring below 22 on the BDI were asked to sign up for a 
supposedly unrelated study being conducted by the research assistant 7-14 days later. 
This deception was deemed necessary to ensure that participants who were later assigned 
to the other-referent MIPs would not enter the experimental phase thinking that they 
might be asked about their self-concept, which could inadvertently prime their self­
schema.
During the experimental phase, participants were tested individually. Participants 
were met by the present author who followed a scripted introduction (see Appendix H). 
After being seated in a comfortable, reclining chair in a small office with soft lighting, 
the researcher asked participants to review and fill out consent form B (see Appendix I). 
Participants were then instmcted to fill out the DACL (Form A) and read instmctions for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
their respective MIP (after the researcher had left). Immediately following the MIP, 
participants completed the DACL (Form B), followed by the same package of 
questionnaires completed at pretest: VAS, ATS Overgeneralization subscale, and SDQ- 
111. The experimental manipulation lasted approximately 30 minutes on average.
After completing the experiment, participants were brought to another room to fill 
out the posttest questionnaire (see Appendix J), which inquired about suspected purposes 
of the study. All participants were then debriefed about the purpose of the experiment and 
the necessity of using deception was discussed. Finally, participants exposed to the 
negative MIPs underwent the positive, self-referent M l? to counteract any negative 
affect, and they were also provided with a distress center contact number.
Experimental Manipulations: Mood Induction Procedures 
Participants were asked to read either a series of positive or negative personal (self­
referent) statements or an illustrated story (other-referent) with either a positive or 
negative tone. The two negative MIPs (negative-self and negative-other) have been 
shown to produce effective mood changes in previous research (Taylor, et al., 1999). 
However, in the Taylor (1999) study, the positive MIPs were not effective in changing 
mood. In an effort to increase the efficacy of the MIPs for the current study, music 
selected to facilitate participants’ induction into a negative or positive mood was played 
throughout the entire experiment. A combined music and story MIP has been found to 
effectively induce both negative and positive mood changes (Mayer et al., 1990).
Reviewers of mood induction research, based on obtained effect sizes of MIP 
manipulations, indicate equivalent lability to mood change across sex, cognitive 
vulnerability levels, and self-esteem (Kelvin et al., 1999; Lewis & Harder, 1988;
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Westermann et al., 1996). The lack of differential responding to the MIPs across 
participant characteristics has implications for the current study, for replication of these 
trends allows for clearer inferences to be made in regard to self-evaluation changes, 
without the confound of mood change being correlated with independent variables.
Self-referent Mood Induction Procedures: Positive and Negative 
A verbal self-referencing procedure developed by Seibert and Ellis (I99I) was used 
to induce positive and negative affect (see Appendices K and L for positive and negative 
statements, respectively). This method has been shown be a valid means of inducing 
happy and sad mood-states as assessed by the DACL and visual analogue scales 
(Teasdale & Fogarty, 1989). The procedure follows from Velten's (1968) empirically 
supported MIP (see Martin, 1990, for a review) but modernizes the language for typical 
college undergraduates. A series of 25 statements were printed on individual pages in a 
booklet (e.g., I know if I try I can make things tum out fine, I wish I could be myself, but 
nobody likes me when I am). Participants were instructed to read aloud the statements 
and focus on their personal meanings, as well as allow themselves to experience any 
mood changes. Tape recorded instructions informed participants, at 20 second intervals, 
to read the next statement in the series. Participants are instructed not to resist the mood 
influences of the statements but attempt to experience them fully (see Appendix M). 
There are no references to somatic states, which heightens the focus on statements that 
reference the self-concept.
Other-referent Mood Induction Procedures 
The other-referent mood inductions are based on a story MIP developed by 
Sedikides (1995). These procedures involve an other-directed, outward attentional focus.
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This other-directed focus requires participants to think about another person as the target 
of an event. Outward attentional focus refers to thinking about another person’s thoughts 
and feelings (Carlson & Miller, 1987). Sedikides (1995) states that this MIP was 
developed to avoid increasing attentional focus on the self. According to cognitive- 
priming theory, this MIP should not activate one’s depressive self-schema. Instructions 
for the other-referent MIPs are listed in Appendix N.
Positive-other
Participants were induced into a positive mood-state by first imagining that a friend 
of the opposite sex had won $100,000 in a lottery. They then imagined for two minutes 
how their friend would think and feel and were provided with a ticket stub of a lottery 
ticket to assist them in their imagination. Participants wrote about their friend’s thoughts 
and feelings for an additional three minutes. Participants were told to imagine for two 
minutes that this friend took a trip to Hawaii to celebrate. Participants were given scenic 
pictures to aid them in their imagery. They then spent three minutes writing about the 
friend's thoughts and feelings when on the vacation in Hawaii.
Negative-other
Participants were induced into a sad mood-state by first imagining that a friend of 
the opposite sex was burned in a fire and was in critical condition. They then imagined 
for two minutes how their friend would feel and think and were provided with 
photographs of bum victims to assist them in their imagination. Participants then spent 
three minutes writing about their friend’s feelings and thoughts. Next, participants 
imagined for two minutes that their friend succumbed to the injuries and died. 
Participants were shown a picture of a funeral scene. Finally, participants wrote for three
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minutes about the feelings and thoughts that the friends’ parents would experience at the 
funeral. The procedure focused on the friends’ parents in order to avoid personal 
implications/references for participants.
Music Selections
The music selections were based on two meta-analyses of past MIP research that 
demonstrate the consistent effectiveness of music in creating transient mood-states 
(Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Martin, 1990). The happy music that was used to 
enhance the positive story and self-statements included “Eine kleine Nachtmusik” and 
“Divertimento” by Mozart. The sad music selections, used to enhance the negative story 
and negative self-statements, were “Adagio in G minor” and “Aboe Concerto, 0P.7, 
No.9” by Albinoni and “The Field of the Dead” from Alexander Nevsky by Prokofiev.
Apparatus
Participants listened to music selections played on an RCA compact disc 
system, model #344A2556-0002, set at the medium volume level. Instructions for the 
MIPs, which accompanied the music, were played on a Samsung tape recorder, model # 1 
TCD200492, set at the medium volume.
Potential Variance of Mood Induction Procedures 
A possible argument can be made that the self-referent versus other-referent 
MIPs are quite different, and that the interpretation of results may be ambiguous due to 
this factor. However, the differences may actually represent a more stringent test of 
hypotheses conceming the self-reference variable for the current study. First, the other- 
referent MIPs can be argued to be more active and personally involving because of the 
writing tasks and visual imagery, compared to the self-referent MIPs that simply require
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participants to read statements. Second, a meta-analysis (Westermann et al, 1996) has 
indicated that Story MIPs are the most effective procedures for the induction of both 
elated and depressed mood states. This finding represents a very strict test of the mood- 
state versus cognitive-priming hypothesis, for if subjective mood alone is sufficient to 
change central self-evaluations, then the other-referent MIPs, shown to induce greater 
changes in mood, should lead to greater self-evaluation changes.





Pretest Group Differences 
Examination of pretest means indicated that, except for participant age, there were 
no pretest differences between MIP experimental conditions (refer to Appendix O). 
Although age differed statistically by experimental group, there was less than a year 
difference between group age means. Pre- and posttest intercorrelations, listed in Table 1, 
show that age did not correlate with any variables under investigation. Furthermore, 
subsequent analyses indicated that age did not represent a significant covariate.
Preliminary investigations also revealed a lack of gender differences on 
overgeneralization tendencies.
Initial Data Screening and Descriptive Statistics 
Initial inspections revealed that missing data were uniformly distributed across the 
data set. Missing values on the self-concept subscales were conservatively replaced with 
overall means, rather than experimental group means, prior to analysis. Table 2 lists the 
means, standard deviations and intemal reliabilities of the thirteen self-concept measures at 
pretest and posttest. Participant ratings for the relative importance of these self-concept 
variables are also provided. Table 3 lists descriptive statistics for self-concept subscales at 
pretest and posttest, by experimental condition.
Creation of Dependent Variables: Principal Components Analysis 
A principal components analysis (PCA) was performed on the thirteen subscale scores 
of the Self Description Questionnaire-Ill (Marsh, 1989) to reduce the number of dependent



























Variable I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Profile scores
1. Age — -06 -13 13 -04 13 10 -02 12 10 03 -03 -03 -10 07 -02
2. BDI-II — 60 -23 -25 -62 -49 -19 -16 -21 -24 -05 -23 -11 -22 -17
3. Overgeneralization - -16 -38 -70 -70 -26 -23 -41 -14 -08 -34 -08 -24 -17
Self-concept scores
4. Academic 16 -19 -15 — 22 19 24 30 28 14 13 05 30 06 18 44
5. Physical App -10 -27 -35 33 — 31 65 08 02 56 07 32 40 20 35 30
6. Emotional Stability -09 -57 -61 27 45 — 63 20 24 35 13 14 34 06 31 16
7. General Esteem -01 -36 -50 39 73 63 — 14 09 62 14 26 42 23 40 28
8. Honesty/Trust -01 -15 -21 39 11 25 24 — 10 17 15 -05 -02 00 12 14


































1  Note. Correlations for pretest scores are presented above the diagonal and correlations for posttest scores are presented below the
diagonal. Correlations, presented without decimal points, greater than . 15 are statistically significant (g < .05, two-tailed). Boldface 
correlations are statistically significant a tg  < .01. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II.
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
10. Opposite Sex 10 -18 -37 33 61 45 70 21 09 — -02 17 29 15 19 26
11. Parent Relations -04 -16 -11 18 22 22 27 20 0! 15 - 09 -05 03 35 13
12. Physical Ability -01 -02 -10 14 40 18 32 -03 05 27 22 — 19 03 34 01
13. Problem Solving 04 -25 -39 32 48 48 52 06 29 41 04 24 — 17 15 32
14. Religion/Spiritual -09 -09 -08 08 20 08 24 07 -06 16 08 05 18 — 20 14
15. Same Sex -03 22 28 23 41 37 46 21 -01 32 32 41 24 18 — 14





Imnortance Ratings at Pre- and Posttest (N = 179)
Variable
Pretest Posttest
Subscale Importance Subscale Importance
General Esteem M 6.17 * 5.96 *
SD (1.2) * (1.4)
a .95 .93
Honesty M 6.02 8.2 6.06 8.2
SD (0.8) (1.2) (0.9) (1.1)
a .71 .79
Parental Relations M 5.93 7.8 5.84 7.8
SD (1.2) (1.6) (1.3) (1.5)
a .88 .91
Emotional Stability M 5.04 7.7 5.04 7.8
SD (1.2) (1.3) (1.3) (1.2)
a .85 .90
Academic M 5.81 7.6 5.70 7.5
SD (1.0) (1.4) (1.1) (1.5)
a .69 .88
Verbal Ability M 5.81 7.4 5.70 7.5
SD (0.9) (1.3) (1.0) (1.2)
a .79 .81
Same Sex Relations M 5.90 7.2 5.82 12
SD (1.1) (1.6) (1.2) (1.4)
a .86 .66
Opposite Sex Relations M 5.68 7.2 5.63 7.4
SD (1.3) (1.6) (1.3) (1.3)
a .89 .93
(table continues)
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Table 2 (continued)
Problem Solving M 5.37 7.0 5.24 6.9
SD (0.8) (1.6) (0.9) (1.5)
a .66 .69
Physical Appearance M 5.00 6.6 4.86 6.8
SD (1.0) (1.8) (1.1) (1.7)
a .56 .81
Math Ability M 4.40 5.6 4.33 5.8
SD (1.7) (2.1) (1.7) (2.1)
a .83 .96
Religion/Spiritual M 5.00 5.5 4.93 5.5
SD (1.6) (2.7) (1.7) (2.6)
a .92 .94
Physical Ability M 5.60 5.4 5.54 5.6
SD (1.6) (2.2) (1.6) (2.4)
a .95 .96
Note. * Participants did not rate the importance of their General Esteem self-concept. 
a = Cronbach's alpha
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Table 3
Pre- and Posttest Means and Standard Deviations as a Function of Experimental
Condition
Positive-self Neaative-self Positive-other Negative-other
(11 = 44) (n = 46) (n = 43) (n = 46)
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Table 3 (continued)
Physical Ability M 5.60 5.67 5.56 5.35 5.58 5.62 5.64 5.54
SD 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6
N ote . Pre = pretest. Post = posttest; Emotional Stab = Emotional Stability; Physical App  ̂
Physical appearance.
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variables entered into subsequent analyses. Pretest scores were employed, rather than 
posttest, because they were considered to be more representative of participants' baseline 
self-evaluations. Consistent with past research (Marsh, 1989), the majority of the subscales 
were significantly intercorrelated (see Table 1). Thus, a promax principal component 
analysis with oblique rotation was performed, which provided a five-component solution 
that accounted for 67% of the total variance.
Dependent variables were created via composite scores^ (unweighted averages) of 
items loading on the individual components. Self-concept subscales were combined based 
on the component that they loaded highest on, with the exception of physical ability. This 
exception will be discussed shortly.
A five-component solution, presented in Table 4, was the most parsimonious solution 
that was consistent with previous research (see Marsh, 1989, for a review). This solution 
also allowed for an appropriate investigation of the current study’s hypotheses surrounding 
importance. A principal components analysis constrained to include only four components 
was completed, however, it was less consistent with results from previous research using 
the Self Description Questionnaire III (Marsh & Hocevar, 1985). This four-component 
solution would also preclude investigation of the importance factor, for it combined self- 
concept subscales that varied in importance. Furthermore, interpersonal and achievement 
aspects of the self, related to sociotropy and autonomy, were more delineated in the five- 
component solution.
General esteem, opposite sex relations, physical appearance, and emotional stability 
had their highest loadings on the first component. Previous research investigating the 
underlying structure of the SDQ-III (Marsh, 1989) suggests that general esteem and
' Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) have endorsed this method of reducing the number of correlated variables.
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Table 4
C om ponent Solution  fN  =  179)
C om p on en t
Subscale h- 1 2 3 4 5
Rotated component loadings (promax)
General Esteem .813 .89 -.04 .08 .03 .07
Honesty/Trust .680 .28 .13 .15 .07 .80
Parent Relations .670 -.22 .10 .82 -.06 .21
Emotional Stability .624 .68 -.15 .10 .34 .22
Academic .740 -.15 .78 .12 .30 .19
Verbal Ability .728 .04 .85 .08 -.26 .13
Same Sex .691 .17 .13 .75 -.09 -.10
Opposite Sex .729 .97 -.04 -.22 -.17 .19
Problem Solve .692 .26 .44 -.18 .31 -.35
Religion/Spirititiial .333 .12 .33 .08 -.39 -.20
Physical Appearance .663 .73 .11 .04 -.13 -.10
Math Ability .767 -.06 .03 -.08 .89 -.01
Physical Ability .575 .12 -.17 .45 .10 -.52
Eigenvalue 3.68 1.45 1.34 1.21 1.02
% o f  variance 28.34 11.14 10.31 9.33 7.85
N ote , h =  com m unality
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emotional stability directly contribute to a hierarchical general self-concept. Accordingly, 
the first component, which accounted for 28% of the total variance in scores, appears to be 
connected to one’s general self-concept and, therefore, was labeled general competence. 
This component can be argued to contain both achievement and interpersonal domains of 
self.
Verbal ability, academic - general, and problem solving subscales had their highest 
loadings on the second component, which was labeled academic competence and 
accounted for 11% of the total variance. This component clearly involves achievement 
domains of self. Although Shavelson’s original theoretical model (Shavelson, Hubner, & 
Stanton, 1976) proposed a single, higher-order academic facet that grouped math and 
verbal abilities together, subsequent research (Marsh & Hocevar, 1985; Marsh & 
Shavelson, 1985; Marsh, 1986) indicated that these academic domains are consistently 
uncorrelated. The PCA solution for the present study is consistent with previous findings; 
there was an insignificant negative correlation (“r” = -.10) between verbal and math 
abilities, and math ability did not load on the second component.
Same sex and parental relations had their highest loadings on the third component. 
Physical ability also loaded highly on this component (.42), however it loaded more 
heavily on the fifth component (-.52), which also had the highest loadings for the 
honesty/trust subscale. The decision to combine physical ability with the two social 
domains, rather than with the honesty/trust subscale, is supported by two arguments. First, 
previous research (Marsh, 1989) consistently finds a substantial correlation between 
physical ability and same sex relations, which is also consistently higher than the 
correlation between physical ability and physical appearance. Second, investigation of the
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current study’s predictions related to importance would be disrupted if physical ability, 
rated as the least important self-concept domain, was combined with honesty/trust, rated as 
the most important self-concept domain. This third component, which accounted for 10% 
of the total variance, taps into interpersonal domains of self, including those that may 
develop within a sporting context, and was labeled social competence.
The fourth component had highest subscale loadings for math ability and a negative 
loading for religion/spiritual. Similar to previous research (Marsh, 1989), religion/spiritual 
did not share the proposed theoretical connection with honesty/trust. Table 1 indicates that 
math ability and religion/spiritual were not significantly correlated. This observation, 
combined with the negative loading for religion/spiritual, supported the decision to treat 
these subscales as separate dependent variables. Math ability represents an achievement 
domain of self, and religion/spiritual is not accurately described as either an interpersonal 
or achievement domain.
Honesty/trust and physical ability loaded most heavily on the fifth component. As 
previously discussed, physical ability was combined with the same sex and parental 
relations subscales, leaving honesty/trust as a separate dependent variable. Previous 
research (Marsh, 1989) has consistently failed to support the theoretical grouping of 
religion/spiritual and honesty/trust into a moral cluster. The low to moderate correlations of 
the honesty/trust with other subscales in previous research is also consistent with results 
from the current study. The highest correlation for honesty/trust was with academic-general 
(“r” = .30). This finding, combined with the fact that honesty/trust was rated as the most 
important self-concept domain, supported the decision to treat honesty/trust as a separate
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dependent variable. Similar to the religion/spiritual scale, honesty/trust is difficult to 
classify as either achievement or interpersonal in nature.
Table 5 lists pre- and posttest intercorrelations for the six dependent variables and 
depression scores, which were entered in subsequent analyses as a covariate. Dependent 
variables were normally distributed, and there were no univariate or multivariate outliers.
To investigate the hypothesized impact of importance on self-evaluation change, new 
importance means were created for the three composite dependent variables. Similar to the 
creation of the dependent variables, these means were derived by pooling (unweighted 
averages) the importance rating means of the corresponding Self Description 
Questionnaire-Ill subscales (see Table 6). Pretest importance ratings were considered to be 
representative of participants’ baseline attitudes.
A precursor to investigating whether the importance of a self-evaluation domain 
influences its stability is determining if the dependent variables differ from each other in 
terms of their relative importance to the participants. Six dependent variables result in 15 
possible unique pairings of importance means. Accordingly, a series of two-tailed, paired- 
samples “t” tests were conducted with Bonferroni corrected alpha set at .003 (.05/15). 
Importance mean pairs were significantly different from each other, except for academic 
and general competence, as well as math ability and religion/spiritual (see Table 6).
To test the current study’s hypothesis that importance influences self-esteem 
reactivity, dependent variables were divided into central and peripheral categories. 
Examination of a scree plot for importance means of the dependent variables suggests that 
a break in the pattern of means occurs between social competence and math ability. As 
such, honesty/trust, academic competence paired with general competence, and social




Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent Variable 
1. General 79" 43** 36* 10 20** 18* -48**
2. Academic 6 l" 72** 18* 18* 15* 20* -29**
3. Social 48" 32** 86** 00 11 09 22**
4. Math Ability 16* 26** 03 89** 07 10 16*
5. Religion/Spiritual 21" 18* 13 -06 93** 00 -11
6. Honesty/Trust 25" 32** 16* 14 07 74** 19**
Covariate 
7. BDI-Il -42" -29** -17* -14 -09 -15*
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventor^' II, which was only measured at pretest. 
Correlations for pretest variables are presented above the boldface diagonal, and 
correlations for posttest variables are presented below the diagonal. Correlations 
between individual variables, pre- to posttest, are presented in boldface, 
p’ < .05; p "  < .001
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Table 6
Pretest Importance Means. Standard Deviations and Classifications (N = 1791
Dependent Variable
Importance
M SD Importance Classification
1. Honesty/Trust 8.18a 1.18 Central
2. Academic 7.32i, 1.1 Central
3. General 7.15b 1.07 Central
4. Social 6.77 c 1.31 Central
5. Math Ability 5.6d 2.1 Peripheral
6. Religion/Spiritual 5.5 d 2.7 Peripheral
Note. Higher means indicate higher importance ratings. Means with different 
subscripts are significantly different at p < .005
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competence, were classified as central self-evaluation domains with decreasing levels of 
importance. Math ability paired with the religion/spiritual domain were classified as 
peripheral self-evaluations.
Self-evaluations and Overgeneralization at Pretest 
Overgeneralization and self-evaluations measured at pretest were examined for 
possible associations. Although this examination does not allow for causal statements, 
because the two constructs were assessed concurrently, it explores whether this 
unprimed/latent cognitive process shares an association with self-esteem. A series of 
sequential multiple regression analyses were conducted in which pretest dependent 
variables were entered as criteria, depression scores were entered in the first step as a 
covariate, and pretest overgeneralization was entered as the predictor variable in the second 
step. Depression scores were entered as a covariate to determine whether self-evaluations 
are associated with overgeneralization tendencies when the effects of depression are 
statistically controlled. Using Holm’s modified Bonferroni correction of alpha (Howell, 
1997), results indicated (see Table 7) that the four central self-evaluation variables were 
associated with participants’ baseline depression scores. After the variance accounted for 
by depression was removed, there remained an association between self-evaluations and 
pretest overgeneralization for general competence [(3 = -.59, t(176) = -8.6, p < .001]. As 
overgeneralization scores increased, general competence evaluations decreased. Although 
not significant at corrected alpha levels, a similar trend was observed for Honesty [(3 = -.22, 
t(176) = -2.5, p =.014], Math Ability [|3 = -.21, t(176) = -2.3, p = .023] and Academic 
Competence [(3 = -.19, t(176) = -2.2, p = .032]. This association between baseline self- 
evaluations and overgeneralization is somewhat surprising, recalling Segal and Ingram’s
































Deoression as Covariate fN =  119).
H onesty G enera! A cad em ic S ocia l M ath  A b ility R elig ion
V aria b le B p t( l7 6 ) B P t( l7 6 ) B p t(176) B P t(176) B P t( 176) B P t(176)
Constant 6.25 57.5*’ 6.18 53.3* 5.98 64.6* 6.13 48.8* 4.82 20.5* 5.27 23.5
BDI-II
Covariate -.026 -.18 -2.5** -.08 -.48 -7.2“ -.03 -.28 -3.9** -.04 -.22 -3 .0 " -.05 -.16 -2.1* -.03 -.12 -1.4
Pretest
OG -.16 -.22 -2.5* -.49 -.59 -8.6“ -.12 -.19 -2.2* -.09 -.11 -1.2 -.32 -.21 -2.3* .001 .00 .01
Note. BDHI = Beck Depression Inventory II; OG = overgeneralization, 
p* < .05, p*"̂  ^ significant at Holm's modified Bonferroni correction
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(1994) argument that cognitive processes/structures (i.e. overgeneralization/depressive self­
schemata) must first be primed before they have an effect on cognitive products.
Effects of Experimental Manipulation 
Manipulation Check on Affect Change 
A repeated measures multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with method 
(self vs. other) and mood (positive vs. negative) representing between-subject variables, 
and time (pretest vs. posttest) as the within-subjects variable, was conducted on the four 
affect variables: DACL negative, DACL positive, VAS sad and VAS happy. Pretest 
depression (BDI-II), which was correlated with the affect variables, was treated as a 
covariate. Sex of participant was also examined, however, there were no significant main 
or interaction effects and this variable was removed from the analysis. Appendix F 
provides descriptive statistics for these variables, by experimental group. Depression was a 
significant multivariate covariate, F(4, 164) = 8.33, p < .001 (see Table 8). A significant 
Time x Mood multivariate interaction, F(4, 167) = 51.79, p < .001, indicated that the mood 
induction procedures effectively changed participants’ mood.
Follow up ANCOVAs indicated significant Time x Mood interactions for all four 
affect variables (see Table 8). Examination of the affect variable means (see Appendix P) 
indicated that these Time x Mood interactions were due to participants in the negative MIP 
conditions reporting more negative/less positive affect at posttest, as well as participants in 
the positive MIPs reporting more positive/less negative affect at posttest.
Pre- to Posttest Change in Overgeneralization 
Recall that the present study’s model of self-esteem reactivity proposes that the 
process of overgeneralization in vulnerable individuals, once primed by negative events.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
Table 8












Source F(4, 164) F(l,  167) F (l ,  167) F (l ,  167) F(l,  167)
Between-subjects effects
BDI-II Covariate 8.33*" 25.47*" 4.67* 17.55*" 15.26*"
Mood (M) 26.13*" 66.45*** 44.67*" 39.82*" 77.1*"
Referent (R) 1.53
M X R 1.71
Within-subjects effects
Time (T) 17.57"* 24.44*** 33.75*" 42.1 28.74*"
T x M 51.79"* 116.17*" 133.14*** 65.21*" 103.32*"
T x R 1.81
T x M x R 1.43
Note. F ratios are Pillai’s approximation of Fs. MANOVA = multivariate analysis of 
variance; ANOVA = univariate analysis of variance; DACL = Depressive Adjective 
Checklist, VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II.
p < .05, 2 < .01, p < .001.
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activates their depressive self-schemata, which then bias the retrieval of negative 
information from memory and decrease self-evaluations. If overgeneralization plays its 
predicted causal role in self-evaluation change, then the overgeneralization tendencies of 
participants’ should be directly influenced by certain MIPs. Table 9 shows pre- and posttest 
descriptive statistics by experimental condition for overgeneralization. Focusing on the 
total sample overgeneralization at present, “t” tests (see Table 9) indicate that the negative- 
self MIP caused an increase in overgeneralization scores [t(45) = 2.51, p = .016], and the 
positive-other MIP caused a decrease in overgeneralization scores [t(42) = -2.86, p = .007]. 
This increase in overgeneralization tendencies after exposure to a procedure that directly 
primes the self can be interpreted within a cognitive-priming framework. However, the 
decrease in overgeneralization scores after the positive-other MIP, rather than the positive- 
self MIP, can not be explained within the cognitive-priming perspective.
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1: Planned Comparisons Examining Change in Self-evaluations 
Pre- and posttest descriptive statistics by experimental MIP are reported in Table 10. 
Stability coefficients (SC: correlations between self-evaluations at pre- and posttest) are 
provided to facilitate interpretation of clinically meaningful change. Of note, the mean SC 
was lowest after the negative-self MIP (“r” = .72), whereas the mean SC’s for the 
remaining MIP groups are similar to the mean test-retest reliability (“r” = .87) of the SDQ- 
III subscales. To test the specific predictions of Hypothesis 1, pre- to posttest change in 
dependent variables were examined via paired samples “t” tests (see Table 11). These 
analyses were based on previous research that employed similar experimental methodology 
(Taylor et al., 1999), and alpha was set at .05.
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Pre Post t(22) Pre Post t(21) Pre Post t(17) Pre Post t(19)
H igh
O vergen eralization M 4.21 3.89 -1.86 4.5 4.44 -.35 4.67 4.37 -1.94 4.47 4.54 .48
S D .61 1.04 .63 .71 .59 .73 .92 .83
Pre Post t(20) Pre Post t(23) Pre Post t(24) Pre Post t(25)
L o w
O vergen era liza tion M 2.49 2.50 .07 2.61 3.41 3.5" 2.81 2.59 -2.06* 2.49 2.66 1.21
S D .6! .77 .57 1.05 .61 .87 .49 .78
Note. Pre = pretest; Post = posttest.
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5  D ep en d en t N egative-self (n = 46) Negative-other tn = 46) Positive-self (n = 44) Positive-other (n = 43)
V ariable Pre Post SC Pre Post SC Pre Post SC Pre Post SC
1. H on esty M 6.04 6.02 .70 6.19 6.10 .74 5.83 6.10 .86 6.03 6.00 .73
S D 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9
2. A ca d em ic M 5.78 5.44 .54 5.67 5.59 .83 5.60 5.59 .81 5.64 5.59 .79
S D 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
3. G eneral M 5.45 4.99 .58 5.58 5.46 .95 5.46 5.59 .81 5.43 5.46 .90
S D 1.0 1.1 l .l 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0
4 . S ocia l M 5.82 5.57 .73 5.87 5.75 .92 5.86 5.91 .91 5.67 5.71 .93
S D 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0
5. M ath M 4.32 4.12 .86 4.47 4.33 .96 4.53 4.38 .92 4.27 4.52 .89
S D 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7
6. R elig io n M 5.04 4.85 .93 5.15 5.20 .93 4.59 4.54 .9! 5.20 5.13 .95
S D 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7
M ean SC .72 .88 .87 .87
Note. Pre = pretest; Post = posttest. SC = Stability coefficient: correlations between dependent variables at pretest and posttest.
<1
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Hypothesis l.a: Central self-evaluations. Mixed support was obtained for Hypothesis 
l.a., which focused on changes in central self-evaluations. Strong support was obtained for 
predictions related to the self-referent MIPs, which were based on cognitive-priming 
theory. Self-evaluations decreased significantly after the negative-self MIP for general 
competence [t(45) = 3.23, p = .002]; academic competence, [t (45) = 3.07, p = .004]; and 
social competence, [t (45) = 2.21, p = .032] (See Table 11). Honesty/trust was the only 
central self-evaluation that did not change significantly under the negative-self condition. 
Honesty/trust was also the only central self-evaluation domain to increase after exposure to 
the positive-self MIP [t (43) = -4.03, p < .001], a result that is also consistent with 
cognitive-priming.
Contrary to predictions regarding the other-referent MIPs, which were based upon social 
comparison theory, central self-evaluations did not increase after the negative-other MIP, 
nor did they decrease significantly after the positive-other MIP. Rather, an overall pattern 
of decreasing self-evaluations was observed across general competence [t(43) = 2.41, p = 
.020], and social competence [t (43) = 2.03, p = .048] after exposure to the negative-other 
MIP (see Table 11). Figures 4, 5, and 6 show changes associated with the four MIP 
experimental conditions for general, academic, and social competence, respectively.
Hypothesis l.b: Peripheral self-evaluations. Results did not support hypothesis Lb., 
which predicted that mood-state effects (i.e., self-evaluation increases after positive MIPs, 
decreases after negative MIPs) would occur for peripheral self-evaluations. There was an 
overall lack of change observed among peripheral self-evaluations. Only math ability 
changed, with a significant increase after the positive-other condition [t(42) = -2.06, p = 
.046] (see Table 11). This result does not appear to support mood-state theory, nor the
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Table 11




t (4 5 )  p
Neeative-other  
t (4 5 )  E
Positive-self 
t (4 3 )  E
Positive-other
t(4 2 )  E
Honesty .18 .858 .95 .347 -4.03 <.001 .30 .763
General 3.23 .002 2.41 .02 -1.66 .103 -.43 .667
Academic 3.07 .004 1.30 .199 .21 .833 .77 .447
Social 2.21 .032 2.03 .048 -.83 .410 -.67 .508
Math 1.30 .202 1.93 .060 1.51 .138 -2.06 .046
Religion 1.81 .077 -.57 .574 .54 .591 .85 .399
Note. Negative t values indicate an increase in scores from pre- to posttest. Positive t 
values indicate a decrease in scores from pre- to posttest.



















Figure 4. Change in General competence from pretest to posttest. Higher scores indicate more favou.uu.^
S = negative-self (n = 46); Pos-S = positive-self (n = 44); Neg-0 = negative-other (n = 46), Pos-0 = positive-other (n = 43).
“p= .002 , V  = .02





































Figure 5. Change in Academic competence from pretest to posttest. Higher scores indicate more favourable self-evaluations. 






































Figure 6. Change in Social competence from pretest to posttest. Higher scores indicate more favourable self-evaluations. Neg- 
S = negative-self (n = 46); Pos-S = positive-self (n = 44); Neg-0 = negative-other (n = 46); Pos-0 = positive-other (n = 43).
































Hypothesis l.c:Differentiai effects of positive and negative MIPs. “T” test results (see 
Table 11) supported the hypothesis that self-evaluation change would be more pronounced 
after exposure to negative (five significant changes), compared to positive (two significant 
changes), MIP conditions.
Hypothesis 2: Overgenerali zation and Self-evaluation Change.
To test Hypothesis 2; that participants who were high in overgeneralization would show 
greater decreases in their central self-evaluations after exposure to the negative-self MIP, a 
median split was performed on pretest overgeneralization scores to create high and low 
overgeneralization groups. Paired samples t-tests were then re-run for dichotomized groups 
to examine change in self-evaluations caused by the negative-self MIP (see Table 12). 
Results directly contrast Hypothesis 2; central self-evaluations of participants reporting 
low, rather than high, overgeneralization at pretest decreased after the negative-self MIP on 
general competence [t(23) = 2.87, p = .009] and academic competence [t(23) = 2.79, p = 
.01], as well as a trend towards a significant decrease for social competence [t(23) = 1.93, p 
= .067] (see Table 12). No significant decreases in central self-evaluations occurred among 
the high overgeneralization group exposed to the negative-self MIP.
Post Hoc Analyses
Change in overgeneralization for high and low overgeneralization groups. To 
determine whether the observed decreases in self-evaluations were directly associated with 
increases in participants’ overgeneralization tendencies, mean changes in 
overgeneralization scores after the negative-self MIP were examined for high and low
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Table 12
Self-evaluation Change Caused by Negative-self Mood Induction Procedure as a 




pretest overeeneralization fn = 22) 
Posttest
Variable M SD M SD t(21)
Honesty 5.70 .91 5.81 1.01 -.89
General 4.84 .92 4.59 .98 1.58
Academic 5.38 .57 5.26 .67 1.5
Social 5.47 .86 5.37 .93 1.15
Math 3.97 2.08 3.99 2.02 -.116
Religion 4.94 1.77 4.71 1.95 2.36*
Dependent
Low pretest overeeneralization fn = 24) 
Pretest Posttest
Variable M SD M SD t(23)
Honesty 6.36 .69 6.22 .79 .82
General 6.01 .59 5.36 1.15 2.87"
Academic 6.14 .72 5.61 .89 2.80"
Social 6.14 .69 5.76 1.25 1.93
Math 4.65 1.90 4.24 1.90 1.63
Religion 5.13 1.75 4.98 1.84 .806
Note. Positive t values indicate a decrease in scores from pre- to posttest. 
Negative t values indicate an increase in scores from pre- to posttest.
*p < .05; **p< -.01
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pretest overgeneralization groups. This exploratory analysis was deemed appropriate after 
hypothesis testing revealed that, contrary to predictions, self-evaluation decreases were 
obtained among participants reporting low pretest overgeneralization. Alpha was set at .025 
for this pair of post hoc analyses. Results mirror the significant self-evaluation decreases 
observed pre- to posttest for the negative, self-referent MIP; a significant increase in 
overgeneralization was obtained for the low pretest overgeneralization group [t(23) = 3.5, p 
= .002], whereas overgeneralization remained largely stable for participants reporting high 
pretest overgeneralization [t(21) = -.35, p = .727] (see Table 9).
Mood-state versus Cognitive-priming. Pattems of self-evaluation change caused by the 
negative MIPs suggest that mood-state effects occurred for some central self-evaluations 
(decreases after both negative MIPs), whereas cognitive-priming effects appeared to occur 
for others (decrease only after negative-self MIP, not negative-other). Furthermore, these 
pattems also appeared to be influenced by participants’ overgeneralization tendencies. 
Additional post hoc analyses focused on self-evaluation changes caused by the negative 
conditions, which are of more theoretical interest within the context of the diathesis-stress 
model linking self-esteem and depression.
Direct testing of the mood-state versus cognitive-priming theories, as well as inclusion 
of the overgeneralization variable, employed multiple sequential regression analyses. 
Holding mood constant at the negative level, referent was contrast coded (-1 for the 
negative-self condition and 1 for the negative-other condition), and overgeneralization, 
after being centered, was treated as a continuous variable. The 2-way interaction term was 
then computed (Aiken & West, 1991). A series of separate regression analyses were 
conducted in which general, academic, and social competences were entered as criteria.
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The appropriate pretest criterion variable (i.e., dependent variable at pretest) and depression 
scores were entered in the first step as covariates. The main effects and interaction term 
were entered together in the second step."* Bonferroni corrected alpha was set at .0167, 
resulting in an overall alpha level of .05 across the three dependent variables under 
investigation.
This analysis was considered to be fairly robust to violations of the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance due to the lack of outliers, the large sample size, and the equal 
number of participants in each experimental condition. The pretest depression variable 
satisfied criteria for inclusion as a covariate: all three dependent variables were negatively 
correlated with depression, and scatterplot examinations indicated linear relationships 
between these variables.
A significant referent main effect was obtained for general competence [(3 = .21, t(85) = 
3.13, p = .002], and academic competence [(3 = .20, t(85) = 2.59, p= .011] (see Table 13). 
These main effects were qualified by significant Referent X Overgeneralization 
interactions for general competence [(3 = -.19, t(85) = -2.76, p = .007], and academic 
competence [|3 = -.25, t(85) = -3.16, p = .002]. There were no main effects, nor interaction, 
for social competence. Referent X Overgeneralization interactions were interpreted by 
solving the regression equation for participants from the negative MIP conditions whose 
pretest overgeneralization scores were one standard deviation above or below the 
overgeneralization mean (SD = 1.18). Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the referent main effect on 
general competence for high pretest overgeneralization participants was not significant
Entering the main effects and interaction terms in one step takes advantage of centering the 
overgeneralization variable.
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Table 13
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Evaluations After Negative Mood 
Induction Procedures With Pretest Overeeneralization. Referent, and Pretest 
Overeeneralization X Referent (n = 92).
Predictor General Academic Social
Variable B P t(85) B P t(85) B P t(85)
Constant .72 1.14 1.63 2.81** -.05 -.10
Pretest
Covariate .83 .73 8.06''* .69 .63 7.27*** .95 .83 12.8***
BDI-II
Covariate -.02 -.08 -.83 -.01 -.09 -.80 .02 .12 1.29
00 .05 .06 .53 -.01 -.01 -.10 -.06 -.06 -.71
Referent (R) .24 .21 3.13** .16 .20 2.59* .09 .09 1.38
Pretest
O G X R -.17 -.19 -2.76** -.16 -.25 -3.16** -.05 -.06 -.92
Note. Pretest overgeneralization scores were centered before the product term was 
calculated. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II; OG = overgeneralization.
p*< .05,p“ < .01 .p*"< .00I
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[p = .03, t(85) = .37 , p > .05]. Rather, low pretest overgeneralization participants showed a 
significant referent main effect [|3 = .39, t(85) = 3.73, p <.001].
Figure 7 depicts general competence changes for high (7A) and low (7B) pretest 
overgeneralization participants, respectively. Thus, low pretest overgeneralization 
participants had significantly lower general competence scores after the negative-self MIP 
compared to the negative-other MIP, but high pretest overgeneralization participant scores 
did not differ for these MIPs. This pattern was also obtained for the academic competence 
variable. Low pretest overgeneralization again showed a significant referent main effect [(3 
= .45, t(85) = 3.63, p < .001], but no referent main effect at high pretest overgeneralization 
[p = -04, t(85) = -.39, p > .05]. Figure 8 depicts academic competence changes for high 
(8A) and low (8B) pretest overgeneralization participants, respectively.
An alternative approach to assessing whether the pattems of self-evaluation change are 
consistent with either mood-state or cognitive-priming theories, involved a repeated 
measures multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) on the central self-evaluations: 
honesty, general competence, academic competence, and social competence. Mood was 
again held constant at the negative level, and time (pretest vs. posttest) was entered as a 
within-subjects variable, referent (self vs. other) and dichotomized overgeneralization (high 
vs. low) were entered as between-subjects variables. Depression was entered as a covariate, 
and statistical analyses indicated that inclusion of this depression covariate did not violate 
the assumption of heterogeneity of slopes. Preliminary investigations indicated that 
inclusion of gender did not result in either a main effect, or any interactions, and it was not 
included in the model. Results (See Appendix Q) are similar to those obtained through the 
multiple regression analyses. The main difference is that the Overgeneralization X Referent


















Figure 7. C hange in G eneral co m p eten ce  caused by the n egative  co n d itio n s for H igh (A ) and L ow  (B ) pretest overgeneraiizers. 















































Figure 8. C hange in A cad em ic  co m p eten ce caused  by the negative con d ition s for H igh (A ) and L ow  (B ) pretest overgeneraiizers. 
H igher scores in d ica te  m ore favourable se lf-eva lu a tion s. OG = O vergeneralization  N eg -S  = n egative-se lf; N e g - 0  = negative-other.





















interaction is insignificant for general competence in the MANCOVA; likely related to the 
loss of power caused by dichotomizing a continuous variable. Additionally, the significant 
time main effect for social competence, obtained through the MANCOVA, documents the 
decrease observed across both negative conditions.
Summary of mood-state versus cognitive-priming results. Combined interpretation of 
hypothesis testing and post hoc analyses sheds light on the primacy of cognition (cognitive- 
priming) or emotion (mood-state) as the mechanism responsible for self-esteem reactivity. 
Distinct patterns of change were obtained for each central self-evaluation domain, and 
these changes offer initial support for both cognitive-priming and mood-state theory.
Strong support was obtained for the influence of overgeneralization on the process of self- 
evalution. Honesty/trust only changed in response to the positive-self MIP. This result, 
combined with the lack of change observed after the negative-other MIP, is consistent with 
cognitive-priming theory. Academic competence decreased after the negative-self MIP, but 
did not substantially decrease after the negative-other MIP, which is also consistent with 
cognitive-priming theory. Furthermore, this pattern was only observed among participants 
who originally reported low or medium levels of overgeneralization. General competence 
decreased after both negative conditions, which initially supports mood-state theory. 
However, this decrease was more pronounced after exposure to the negative-self MIP, 
which lends support to cognitive-priming theory. Again, this pattern only occurred among 
participants with low and medium unprimed overgeneralization levels. Social competence 
showed decreases of similar magnitude after both negative MIPs, which offers initial 
support for the mood-state hypothesis.
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Math ability and religion, the two peripheral self-evaluations of similar low 
importance, remained largely stable after the MIPs, with the exception of a significant 
increase in math ability after the negative-other MIP. This finding runs counter to both the 
cognitive-priming and the mood-state theory. Table 14 summarizes the current findings and 
the extent to which they support cognitive-priming or mood-state theories.
Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
Participant responses to the post-experiment questionnaire functioned as 1) additional 
manipulation checks, and 2) a method of investigating demand characteristics.
Manipulation Check
The frequency of completing the post-experiment questionnaire, which differed by MIP 
group (3, N = 179) = 8.22, p = .042, can be interpreted as behavioural evidence for the 
mood-altering efficacy of the MIP conditions. Appendix R shows that participants in the 
negative MIP conditions, compared to the positive MIPs, completed the post-experiment 
questionnaire more frequently. Research (Begin, 1976) has shown that people induced into 
negative versus positive moods, through a success or failure MIP, differed in their 
willingness to help an experimenter. Individuals reporting low mood after a forced failure 
on an experimental task were more likely to comply with experimenter’s request for help, 
compared to participants exposed to a success MIP. Begin (1976) concluded that “failure” 
participants’ generosity was motivated by an effort to repair their self-image. Similarly, 
participants exposed to the negative, versus positive, MIP conditions in the present study 
may have completed the post-experiment questionnaire more frequently to counteract their 
negative mood.
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An additional manipulation check examined the effectiveness of the MIPs in directing 
participants’ focus internally versus externally. Responses to the question “During the first 
part of the experimental manipulation today were you focusing on, a) mainly yourself, b) 
mainly someone else, or c) both myself and someone else”, are listed in Appendix S.
The MIPs were largely effective in manipulating self-focus, with few participants 
reporting that their focus of attention conflicted with their experimental condition (e.g., 
focusing on someone else during self-referent condition). Analyses were re-run after 
removing participants who reported self-foci that conflicted with their experimental MIP. 
No change was observed in the patterns of results. Appendix S indicates that the majority 
of participants in the negative, other-referent MIP (28 out of 43 responses) reported a 
combined focus on someone else and themselves. To help clarify the apparent mood-state 
effect obtained for social competence, change in this domain caused by the negative-other 
MIP was examined for this subgroup of participants. These students reported larger 
decreases in social competence, t(27) = 2.78, p = .01, relative to all participants in the 
negative-other MIP, as well as participants in the negative-self MIP (see Table 11).
Demand Characteristics
Investigation of potential demand characteristics examined participant’s level of 
insight into the purpose and hypotheses of the experiment, which was queried by the post­
experiment questionnaire. Responses were categorized by the experimenter into three 
groups, 1) lack of insight [ex., “the purpose of the experiment was to determine how well 
we were able to perceive others feelings”], 2) mood manipulation: the belief that the 
experiment was designed solely to influence mood, without any mention of self-concept 
change [ex., “the purpose of the research was to see if you could change my mood from
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beginning of the study to the end”] and 3) Insightful: hypothesizing a connection between 
mood change and change in self-concept [ex., “to see if your mood affects how you feel 
about yourself”].
Appendix T shows that insight levels did not differ across the experimental groups. 
Demand characteristics were targeted by re-running analyses for specific insight levels. 
Reanalysis of change in affect scores, using the same repeated measures multivariate 
analysis of covariance, indicated that the effect size for the significant Time x Mood 
interaction was greatest among participants who believed the purpose of the experiment 
was to change mood, F (4,42) = 42.21, p. < .001, r\  ̂= .80, compared to insightful 
participants, F (4, 64) = 27.3, p < .001, r\  ̂= .63, as well as compared to the total sample, F 
(4, 167) = 51.79, p < .001, r f  = .56. Sample size was too small to run a separate analysis 
for lack of insight participants.
Hypothesis testing and post hoc analyses were re-run for insightful participants, as 
well as for two combined groups, including 1) participants reporting lack of insight and 
mood manipulation insight levels, and 2) participants reporting mood manipulation and 
insightful rationales. Groups were combined to increase sample size. The pattem of results 
obtained for the entire sample emerged for insightful participants, as well as the group 
including insightful and mood manipulation participants (see Appendices U and V, 
respectively). There was a lack of self-evaluation change for participants in the combined 
lack of insight and mood manipulation group (see Appendix W). Post hoc tests employing 
multiple regression analyses also revealed that both the insightful participants, and the 
combined insightful and mood manipulation group, show a pattem of main effects and 
interactions consistent with the total sample (see Appendices X and Y, respectively). This
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pattem did not emerge, however, for the lack of insight and mood manipulation combined 
group (see Appendix Z).




Summary and Interpretation of Results 
The present study was designed to test the ability of two opposing theories, cognitive- 
priming and mood-state, to explain the mechanisms that are responsible for changes in self- 
evaluations. Results of the current study help clarify past research that has found support 
for both theories. A clear theoretical victor did not emerge from the analyses, rather, self- 
evaluation change appears to be a complicated process that requires both theories to 
interpret subtle nuances. The nuances that emerged included the normative importance of 
the evaluations, the cognitive style of the individual making the self-evaluations, and 
potential differences between social and achievement domains of the self.
The primary hypothesis of the current study predicted that the four mood-induction 
procedures (MIPs) would cause different patterns of self-evaluation change, and change 
would be moderated by the importance assigned by participants to these separate domains 
of self. This overall hypothesis was supported by the current results. However, not all of 
the specific predictions associated with the first hypothesis were supported. The first 
specific prediction examined changes in self-evaluations deemed important (i.e., central 
self-evaluations). Social comparison theory predicted that exposure to MIPs that focus on 
an external individual would shift self-evaluations in the opposite direction of the induced 
mood. Students would rate important areas of their self more favourably after comparing 
themselves to someone who was worse off. Conversely, students would rate important 
areas of their self less favourably after comparing themselves to someone who was better 
off. This pattem did not emerge. Student’s self-evaluations were stable after the positive
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procedure that focused on an external person. Furthermore, self-evaluations tended to 
decrease, rather than increase^ after the procedure that focused on a negative extemal 
event. This finding, more consistent with mood-state theory than social comparison, 
effectively set the stage for a direct test of mood-state versus cognitive-priming theories.
Mood-state versus Cognitive-priming 
Although hypotheses were based upon cognitive-priming formulations, the pattem of 
change for interpersonal self-evaluation domains appeared to offer support for mood-state 
theory, whereas patterns of change for other domains of self offered support for cognitive- 
priming theory. Honesty/tmst, which was rated as the most important domain of self in the 
current sample, was the only evaluation that improved after exposure to the experimental 
procedure that targeted an individual’s positive sense of self. This increase, when combined 
with a lack of change in honesty ratings for students exposed to the MIP designed to create 
a happy mood devoid of self-reference, supports cognitive-priming theory.
Following from Bower’s associative network theory (1981), the positive, self-referent 
procedure arguably primes one’s emotional node for joy, as well as the cognitive nodes 
involving personal thoughts of a positive nature. This process is akin to activating 
participants’ “idealized self’ (Markus and Nurius, 1986), which then selectively guides the 
interpretation of questionnaire items and the retrieval of particular memories (i.e. the 
cognitive process of self-evaluation). The positive procedure that focused on extemal 
events also activated participants’ emotional node for joy, demonstrated via increases in 
positive mood, however, because this procedure made no reference to self, the threshold for 
activating the “idealized self” was not reached and honesty ratings did not change.
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Consistent with previous mood induction research (Mayer et al., 1990), the positive 
MIPs were less powerful manipulators of mood, relative to the negative conditions. 
Theorists (Westerman et al., 1996) have argued that people’s baseline mood is largely 
positive, so there is little room for improvement. Perhaps a similar argument can be made 
for thoughts related to the self; people generally feel positive about themselves. As such, 
there is little room for increases in self-evaluation, which may explain why honesty is the 
only self-evaluation to change in response to the positive self-statement MIP. Because no 
other changes occurred for the remaining important self-evaluation domains after exposure 
to the two positive MIPs, the effects of the negative MIPs became the focus for the rest of 
the analyses.
Honesty/trust was the only central self-evaluation domain that did not decrease after 
exposure to the negative, self-referent MIP. Honesty holds the highest importance rating 
among participants. Perhaps a result of this ranking is that participants may be particularly 
resistant to thoughts of personal dishonesty that would accompany a depressive self­
schema. An alternative, and likely more probable, explanation for this stability involves 
procedural elements related to the negative, self-referent procedure. This MIP employed 
negative statements that specifically targeted participants’ general, academic and social 
competencies, yet participants’ sense of honesty was never directly challenged. Within 
Bower’s model, although the negative, self-referent MIP activated participants’ sad 
emotional node, there was less activation of personal thoughts related to dishonesty.
Change in participants’ sense of academic competence, rated second in importance, 
supported cognitive-priming theory because declines occurred only after exposure to the 
negative procedure that directly targeted their sense of self. Participants’ change in general
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competence, similar in importance to academic competence, appears to offer support for 
both theories. General competence decreased after both MIPs, which can be interpreted as 
supporting mood-state theory, however, the decrease is comparatively greater after 
exposure to the negative, self-referent MIP; a result consistent with cognitive-priming 
theory. Equivalent decreases in social competence were obtained after both negative MIPs, 
suggestive of mood-state effects.
Bower’s (1981) model is capable of interpreting these patterns of change, and helps to 
determine whether the results support the primacy of cognition or emotion in self- 
evaluation change. Beck’s (1967, 1976) depressive self-schema can be equated to a specific 
series of cognitive nodes within an individual’s associative semantic memory. Important 
self-evaluations are argued to represent well-elaborated cognitive nodes within this system. 
For self-evaluations to drop, cognitive nodes representative of depressive self-schemata 
must be activated, in addition to negatively toned emotional nodes. Negative mood, devoid 
of self-reference, represents insufficient activation for access to negative, “dreaded” views 
of the self.
This postulation explains the cognitive-priming effect obtained for academic 
competence. How does this argument account for the observed decreases in general and 
social competence caused by the procedure designed to avoid self-reference? Incorporation 
of the sociotropy/autonomy conception of depressive schemata helps to clarify the results 
of the present study. The negative imaginal procedure required participants to visualize that 
a friend had died in a car crash, and imagine attending their funeral with friends and family 
members. Accordingly, these themes of interpersonal loss may have primed cognitive 
nodes related to social relationships (interpersonal depressive self-schemata). Supporting
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this argument is the finding that social competence decreases were largest among 
participants who reported a joint focus on themselves and their friend during the negative, 
other-referent procedure. General competence, which includes opposite sex and physical 
appearance subscales that are social in nature, can be argued to have decreased due to the 
activation of this interpersonal depressive schemata. The negative, self-referent procedure 
caused greater decreases in participants’ feelings of general competence presumably 
because it activated both their achievement and interpersonal depressive schemata. 
Conversely, the other-referent procedure appeared to have little impact on achievement 
schemata, demonstrated by the lack of change in academic competence.
Adherents to mood-state theory would argue that priming of negative emotional nodes, 
caused by the negative, other-referent procedure, was sufficient to cause decreases in 
general and social competencies. More specifically, negative cognitive nodes within 
associative memory became indirectly primed through their connection to negatively 
valenced emotional nodes. This argument, however, does not account for the stability of 
the academic domain after the negative, other-referent procedure, nor does it account for 
the larger decreases in general competence after the negative, self-referent procedure, 
despite similar decreases in mood. Collectively, interpretation of patterns of self-evaluation 
change largely support cognitive-priming theory when considering interpersonal and 
achievement depressive self-schemata, as well as participants’ self-reported foci. However, 
altemate explanations derived from mood-state theory are also plausible for some, but not 
all the domains of self.
The second specific prediction associated with the primary hypothesis examined 
change in self-evaluations considered to be unimportant (i.e., peripheral self-evaluations).
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There was an overall lack of change for these evaluations, except for an increase in math 
competence after the positive procedure that focused on an extemal other. This result is not 
consistent with either mood-state or cognitive-priming theory. Self-evaluations considered 
to be less important are likely less elaborated/prominent within an individual’s sense of 
self. Accordingly, activation of depressive self-schemata does not include cognitive nodes 
related to these domains.
Overgeneralization Effects 
Prior to any experimental manipulation, participants’ reporting higher 
overgeneralization tendencies also rated themselves as lower on self-evaluations in a 
number of domains. This association, which remained even after removing the influence of 
depression, was most pronounced for general competence, with a weaker connection 
emerging for honesty, academic competence, and math ability. Of note, there was no 
association between overgeneralization and social competence. This finding suggests that 
participants who engage in the cognitive process of overgeneralization may also hold an 
enduring and stable depressive self-schemata for achievement aspects of self that guided 
their pretest self-evaluations. The lack of association between social competence and 
overgeneralization offers further support for the multi-dimensional nature of the self.
Baseline (unprimed) overgeneralization scores predicted decreases in achievement self- 
evaluations caused by the negative MIPs. This predictive relationship, however, 
contradicted Hypothesis 2. Participants with high baseline overgeneralization tendencies 
did not report more derogatory self-evaluations after the negative, self-referent procedure. 
Rather, low and medium baseline overgeneralization tendencies predicted more derogatory 
general and academic competence after exposure to the self-referent, negative MIP.
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This finding can be argued to suggest that participants who overgeneralize without any 
direct provocation have regular access to active, rather than latent, achievement depressive 
self-schema that guided their self-evaluations at pretest. Thus, there is no drop in self- 
evaluations after either of the negative MIPs because their overgeneralization tendency is 
negatively biasing their self-construal on both occasions. Conversely, participants who 
report low and average levels of unprimed overgeneralization do not ordinarily have access 
to their latent depressive schemata, which explains their comparatively higher self- 
evaluations at pretest. The negative, self-referent procedure required participants to actively 
ruminate on their personal failures and short-comings in a number of different domains of 
self. In essence, this MIP mimics the cognitive process of overgeneralization, and results in 
the activation of depressive self-schemata.
The close association between overgeneralization and self-esteem reactivity is 
highlighted through the varied influences of the negative MIPs. The negative, self-referent 
procedure caused an increase in overgeneralization tendencies among participants reporting 
low and medium levels of baseline overgeneral ization. This increase mirrored the decreases 
in general and academic competencies among the same participants. Participants with high 
baseline overgeneralization showed a lack of change in both their self-evaluations and their 
tendency to overgeneralize. Due to the experimental design employed, which measured 
primed overgeneralization levels and self-evaluations concurrently, statements that would 
attribute the cause of the self-evaluation changes to overgeneralization processes must be 
avoided.
In contrast to the association between overgeneralization and changes in autonomous 
domains, overgeneralization appeared to be unrelated to changes in sociotropic domains.
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There were no increases in overgeneralization tendencies after the negative, other-referent 
procedures, yet this experimental manipulation caused self-evaluation decreases for 
sociotropic domains. Again, this finding suggests a lack of association between 
overgeneralization and access/priming of interpersonal depressive schemata.
There was an apparent asymmetry in the effects of the MIPs on overgeneralization. 
There was no decrease in overgeneralization after the positive, self-referent MIP, despite 
the procedure being designed to increase participants’ self-esteem. Equally surprising was 
the observed decrease in overgeneralization caused by the positive, other-referent 
procedure. A tentative explanation for this finding draws upon research that links self­
focused attention with depressive states (see Ingram, 1990, for a review). Lewinsohn and 
colleagues (1985) provide a theoretical explanation for this effect. They argue that the 
activation of a depressive self-schemata results in increased self-awareness, which then 
hinders one’s abilities in behavioural and social areas, thereby maintaining depression.
Based on this argument, results from the current study suggest that a positive mood that 
avoids priming the self may distract participants from ruminating on their failures or 
personal inadequacies. Positive mood that involves direct priming of the self, however, 
appears to maintain an individuals normal level of overgeneralization. Despite decreased 
overgeneralization after the negative, other-referent MIP, there were no matching increases 
in self-evaluations. One possible explanation is that participants were able to initially 
distract themselves from their usual cognitive ruminations while filling out the 
overgeneralization measure, however, filling out the self-concept questionnaire refocused 
their attention on themselves, resulting in the return of their normal overgeneralization 
tendencies, and a lack of change in their self-evaluations.
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Clinical versus Statistical Significance of Self-evaluation Changes 
Interpretation of self-evaluation changes must be tempered with an understanding of the 
clinical significance of these changes. Cohen (1965) was one of the earliest theorists to 
discuss the notion that statistically significant findings may not be meaningful clinically. 
Previous research (Marsh, Richards, & Bames,1986) investigating the reactivity of 
responses on the Self Description Questionnaire-Ill (SDQ-III) to interventions designed to 
improve self-esteem provide a context for evaluating meaningful change. Stability 
coefficients (correlations between SDQ-III subscales assessed at two time periods) for 
students completing an outward bound course were quite similar to the pre- to posttest 
correlations between self-evaluations in the current study. Furthermore, change in 
important self-evaluations caused by the negative, self-referent procedure were much larger 
than changes found for students in the outward bound program. The greatest self-concept 
increase for Outward Bound participants occurred in their honesty ratings, which mirrors 
the current study’s increase in honesty ratings after the positive, self-referent condition. 
Perhaps attitudes are more amenable to positive change, relative to competencies in 
achievement or interpersonal domains.
Demand Characteristics 
Demand characteristics were initially discussed as a potential confound for the present 
study, and they represent a common concem for research employing both the MIP 
methodology and self-reports measures (Polivy & Doyle, 1980; Westermann et al., 1996). 
The use of a face valid self-concept measure, combined with experimental instructions that 
asked participants to actively try and change their mood, may have informed participants’ 
about the purpose of the experiment, and influenced their responding at posttest. The
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finding that significant self-evaluation change only occurred among participants who 
reported medium or high levels of insight into the study’s hypotheses might be interpreted 
as evidence that participant responses were motivated by demand effects, rather than 
caused by the experimental manipulations. An alternative argument is that the experimental 
procedures successfully manipulated the mood and self-evaluations of some participants, 
and it was this experience that resulted in their greater insight. Related to this argument is 
the observation that participants who reported the greatest mood change also hypothesized 
that manipulating mood was the sole purpose of the experiment.
Resolving these opposing arguments, in favour of “actual” experimental effects rather 
than solely demand characteristics, is the complexity of the results. Why would participants 
exposed to the negative MIPs be more inclined to assist the researcher than participants 
exposed to the positive MIPs? Similarly, why would demand characteristics result in self- 
evaluation changes for important domains, but have no effect on unimportant domains? Are 
participants savvy enough to predict that unimportant domains of self should stay relatively 
stable? Why would participants with low and medium levels of overgeneralization be 
influenced by demand characteristics, but not those with high levels of overgeneralization? 
The majority of experimental research with human participants is influenced by demand 
characteristics (Ome, 1962), however, the complex patterns of results observed in the 
current study suggest that the MIPs influence participant’s actual thoughts and feelings. 
Furthermore, echoing the writings of Polivy and Doyle (1980), the implicit demand 
characteristics associated with mood induction procedures can be viewed as facilitating 
genuine mood shifts.
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Integration with Past Literature 
Resolving Controversies 
Integration of the present findings with past research requires an understanding of the 
complex interactions of the variables under study. Clarifying past debates in the literature is 
achieved by examining finer grained distinctions of the variables influencing changes in 
self. Since the cognitive vulnerability of overgeneralization appears to influence how the 
cognitive-priming versus mood-congruency debate unfolds, integration of the current 
study’s results with past research will focus on this construct.
The current study adhered to the advice of Segal and Ingram (1994) that “the key to 
assessment of cognitive vulnerability is to study the activation of negative self-referent 
cognitive structures” by employing priming methodologies that differ in their focus on self­
reference. The current research helps to resolve previous debate surrounding cognitive- 
priming versus mood-state theories, as well as the predictive validity of cognitive 
vulnerabilities such as overgeneralization. The finding that unprimed overgeneralization 
scores share a large association with most self-concept subscales, among a population of 
individuals with sub-clinical depression, contradicts Carver and colleagues’ (1998) 
contention that overgeneralization is merely a concomitant effect of depression.
The association between baseline honesty and achievement self-evaluations, with 
overgeneralization tendencies, among participants screened for clinical depression, is 
surprising for two reasons. First, it contradicts recent arguments (Segal & Ingram, 1994) 
that suggest cognitive vulnerabilities, such as overgeneralization, must first be activated 
(primed) before they affect cognitive products (self-evaluations) and memory. Second, it 
contradicts research (Dobson & Shaw, 1986; Kuiper, Olinger, & MacDonald, 1988;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
Swallow & Kuiper, 1987) that failed to obtain evidence of depressive schemata in remitted 
depressives. This result also suggests that self-esteem reactivity may be present in non­
depressed individuals, representing a possible onset vulnerability factor for future 
depressive episodes.
Furthermore, cognitive-priming effects observed among participants with low and 
medium unprimed overgeneralization offers some support for the predictive validity of 
overgeneralization (Hammen, Marks, Mayol, & deMayo, 1985; Metalsky, Halberstadt, & 
Abramson, 1987), and contradicts research that suggests a strictly non-causal, concomitant 
function (Dobson, 1986; Kuiper, Olinger, & McDonald, 1988; Swallow & Kuiper, 1987).
Low level feelings of competence among participants who report high levels of 
unprimed overgeneralization, combined with a lack of self-evaluation/overgeneralization 
change after the negative, self-referent procedure, supports Beck’s (1967,1976) notion of a 
stable, trait-like, depressive schema, at least for achievement domains of self. These 
participants appear to have immediate access to what Markus and Nurius (1986) describe 
as a “dreaded self’. Previous research has had difficulty showing stable cognitive 
vulnerabilities in remitted depressives (Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Carver, La Voie, Kuhl, & 
Ganellen, 1988; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983, 1986; Dobson, 1986). Results of the present study 
draw a direct link between a hypothesized cognitive vulnerability (overgeneralization) and 
low self-esteem across achievement domains of self. Given that participants were screened 
for depression, this finding is particularly important.
Recall the argument of Safran, Segal, Hill, and Whiffen (1990), that the “question as to 
whether schematic processing differences merely reflect the effects of mood, rather than 
the operation of a cognitive structure, has yet to be conclusively resolved.” (p. 145).
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Results support the primacy of self-referent cognition as the mechanism primarily 
responsible for activating depressive schemata, at least within the sample investigated in 
the present study. Negatively toned cognition, therefore, does not appear to be simple by­
products of emotional disturbance for these individuals. Rather, negative thoughts related 
to the self appear to be necessary antecedents to self-esteem fluctuations among 
participants who do not normally overgeneralize the personal implications of unfavourable 
outcomes. However, the argument that negative cognition must occur before self- 
evaluations drop does not discount the role of affect. Recalling Bowers’ (1981) and Markus 
and Nurius’ (1986) location of the self-concept within a system of affective-cognitive 
structures, without the negative emotional nodes being primed concurrently with the 
cognitive nodes, self-evaluations may not have decreased.
The Impact of Importance 
Change in central versus peripheral self-evaluation domains supports the theoretical 
inclusion of importance as a factor that influences self-concept (Byrne, 1996; Harter, 1996; 
James, 1890). The finding that peripheral self-evaluations were relatively stable can be 
interpreted as evidence that feelings of incompetence in unimportant domains have little 
impact on self-esteem. The observation that self-concept domains of varying importance 
react differently to personal experiences provides further evidence that the construct of self 
is composed of multiple dimensions.
Results from the current study share some overlap with those obtained by Sedikides 
(1995), who investigated peripheral and central aspects of self. Sedikides used mood 
induction procedures very similar to the other-referent experimental manipulations in the 
current study. Sedikides found that central self-conceptions (behaviour and trait self-
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descriptive adjectives) were unaffected by the MIPs, whereas central self-evaluations of an 
interpersonal nature decreased in the present study. Similar to Sedikides’ research, 
academic competence was unaffected by an imaginal MIP devoid of reference for 
achievement domains of the self, and Sedikides’ descriptive adjective stimuli may not have 
assessed the activation of participants interpersonal depressive schemata. Sedikides’ 
finding of mood-state effects for peripheral self-conceptions matches the observed increase 
in math ability after the positive, other-referent MIP. Perhaps the activation of positive 
emotional nodes within an individuals’ semantic memory, combined with a lack o f focus on 
the self, allows for mood cues to guide peripheral self-evaluations.
Sociotropy and Autonomy Dimensions 
Theorizing of sociotropic and autonomous dimensions underlying depressive self­
schemata (Beck, 1983, 1987; Rector, Segal, & Gemar, 1998), and research on the schema- 
congruency hypothesis ( see Dozois & Backs-Dermott, 2000 for a review), was supported 
by the interaction between the MIPs and patterns of self-evaluation change. Support for the 
theoretical distinction between achievement and interpersonal domains of self also signifies 
that previous calls (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Segal, 1988) to investigate how specific types 
of life stress can trigger depression are warranted, and it contravenes Coyne and Whiffen’s 
(1995) questioning of whether sociotropy and autonomy represent distinct characteristics.
The vast majority of previous research investigating schema-congruency effects for 
sociotropy/autonomy dimensions obtains support for the predictive power of the sociotropy 
construct, but less consistent support for the autonomy construct (Dozois & Backs- 
Dermott, 2001). This asymmetry was not found in the present study. The priming of 
participants’ interpersonal schemata through the negative, imaginal condition did not result
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in decreased achievement self-evaluations, whereas priming of participants’ achievement 
schemata through the negative, self-referent condition did affect these evaluations. 
Furthermore, an association between the cognitive process of overgeneralization and 
achievement domains of self emerged, yet this association was absent from interpersonal 
domains of self. Collectively, these results strongly argue for the continued exploration of 
the autonomy construct within schema-congruency research.
Contributions to the Literature 
Mood induction procedures are analogous to the life events incorporated in the 
Diathesis-Stress model, and therefore, they represent priming procedures that meet Safran 
et al.’s (1990) criteria for ecological validity. The use of MIPs varying in self-reference 
further refined the Diathesis-Stress model by examining which types of life events impact 
upon self-esteem reactivity. This methodology answers the call of Hammen (1985) to 
“modify formulations (cognitive) to include much more specific predictors of 
person/environment conditions that lead to depression” (p.45). The lack of significant 
interaction between mood and self-reference ( i.e., an equal change in positive and negative 
mood, irrespective of self-reference) is a necessary condition for proper investigation of the 
mood-state versus cognitive-priming debate. If the self-referent MIPs result in more 
powerful shifts in mood, compared to other-referent MIPs, one would be unable to 
determine if resulting self-evaluation changes were related to self-reference, or greater 
mood changes. The methodology of the current study, with its differential priming of 
achievement and interpersonal domains, is likely to be particularly useful for future 
research examining multiple aspects of the self within the context of mood-state and 
cognitive-priming theories.
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The current study’s use of a comprehensive, empirically validated, measure of self- 
concept allowed for a more realistic investigation of the self-evaluation process, rather than 
relying on participant response times to personal adjectives or recall of positive/negative 
word lists. Furthermore, the inclusion of importance ratings for self-concept domains 
helped refine and extend previous research that becomes muddied when this factor is not 
examined. The experimental design allowed for practical study of the self, within a 
controlled setting.
The current study highlights both the association between the cognitive process of 
overgeneralization and depression levels, as well as the substantial connection between 
overgeneralization and self-esteem reactivity. Researchers investigating the effects of 
overgeneralization would benefit from incorporating the current study’s methodology to 
reduce individual variance in this variable; recall that all participants reported fairly similar 
levels of overgeneralization after the negative, self-referent MIP.
Theoretical and Clinical Implications
The present study supports Segal’s (1988) theorizing that cognitive processes 
(overgeneralization) and structures (depressive self-schemata) may predispose individuals 
to depression. Although Segal argued that these cognitive structures remain latent until 
activated, the present study suggests that some individuals may have access to these 
derogatory thought processes on a regular basis, which leads to low feelings of competence 
and self-worth. Furthermore, results also suggest that an individuals’ depressive 
achievement self-schema may hold stronger associations with cognitive vulnerabilities. 
Both cognitive theorists and researchers would benefit from continued incorporation of 
latency/priming conceptualization in their work.
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In light of recent evidence pointing to self-esteem reactivity as a stronger predictor of 
depression (Roberts & Gotlib, 1997; Roberts & Monroe, 1994), than level of self-esteem, 
the current study’s refinement of specific factors that influence the process of self- 
evaluation change certainly holds clinical importance. Cognitive therapists have 
incorporated the correction/elimination of cognitive vulnerabilities into their applied 
activities. Working backwards from research suggesting that self-esteem reactivity predicts 
depression, therapeutic goals aimed at minimizing overgeneralization tendencies could help 
to buffer individuals’ from developing depression. Helping clients to compartmentalize the 
impact of negative events may prove to be an important therapeutic aim. Furthermore, the 
observed influence of self-reference on self-esteem reactivity suggests that therapeutic 
discussion that examines interpretation of negative life events is likely a useful therapeutic 
endeavor. The current study also offers support for recent therapy programs specifically 
designed to enhance self-esteem as a means to counteract depression (Bums, 1993).
Limitations
Generalization of results outside the laboratory is always an issue with experimental 
research, and extemal validity concems temper the results of the current study. Although 
the mood induction procedures are “analogous” to life events, the repercussions for 
participants’ sense of self are only imagined. Future research could examine self- 
evaluation changes after real life negative and positive events that differentially impact 
interpersonal and achievement domains of self. The loss in experimental control would 
be balanced by an increase in ecological validity of such an approach.
The exclusion of participants reporting elevated depressive symptoms also limits 
generalizability of results. Although this constraint likely decreased potential
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confounding variance related to depression, the self-evaluations of depressed individuals 
could follow different patterns of change. Conducting the same experiment with a 
depressed sample, for instance, may provide support for the mood-state theory; perhaps 
subjective mood alone is sufficient to further bias the self-evaluations of depressed 
individuals.
Another generalizability concern related to our participant sample is the use of 
university undergraduate students. Wintre, North, and Sugar (2001) have discussed the 
potentially negative implications of an over-reliance on undergraduate participants. 
Despite the theoretical rationale provided for studying self-esteem fluctuations within this 
age group, argued to be in a process of solidifying their sense of self, the present study’s 
specific findings may be directly related to the unique characteristics of this sample. For 
example, a non-university sample likely would not attach the same importance to the 
academic self-evaluations that comprised the main achievement domain in the current 
study. Although the relative importance of the self-evaluation domains would likely be 
dependent upon the population sampled, I would argue that the overall patterns of change 
would remain; important self-evaluation domains would change in accordance with the 
cognitive-priming theory, and unimportant self-evaluation domains would remain 
relatively stable. Replicating the current study across various samples would further 
delineate the complexities involved in cognitive models of self-esteem reactivity and 
depression.
Related to statistical conclusion validity, the reliance on specific, hypothesized 
predictions (planned comparisons) and inclusion of Holm’s modified Bonferroni (Howell, 
1997) helped conserve alpha levels. However, due to the complexity of the current study, a
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large number of analyses were conducted, which increased the possibility of Type I errors. 
Despite this concern, many of these analyses were based on previous research findings, and 
the pattern of results suggests that the relatively small changes in self-evaluations are 
interpretable within a unified theory. Supportive of this argument is the fact that observed 
self-evaluation changes in the present study were greater than changes measured in late 
adolescents before and after enrollment in a motivational program designed to increase 
self-esteem.




Attitude Towards Self Scale -  OverReneralization Subscale
Please rate your agreement with the following statements using the rating scale provided 
below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 very 1 strongly 1 agree 1 neither 1 disagree 1 strongly 1 very








Noticing one fault of mine makes me think more and more about other faults. 
When even one thing goes wrong 1 begin to feel bad and wonder if 1 can do well 
at anything at all.
How 1 feel about myself overall is easily influenced by a single mistake.
The things about myself that other people like and respect are unimportant to me 
when 1 feel down.
1 often change from feeling extremely good about myself to seeing only the bad 
in me and feeling like a failure.
If something goes wrong -  no matter what it is -1 see myself negatively.
My feelings about myself drop if 1 notice any weaknesses or shortcomings.




Please rate your current mood state using the adjectives listed below by making a 






























- —  100 
extremely






■—  100 
extremely
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Appendix C
Depressive Adjective Checklist -  Form A
DIRECTIONS: Below you will find words that describe different kinds of moods and 
feelings. Circle the words that describe How You Feel Now. Some of the words may 
sound alike, but we want you to circle all the words that describe your feelings. Work 
rapidly and circle all of the words that describe how you feel now.
1. Wilted 17. Strong
2. Safe 18. Tortured
3. Miserable 19. Listless
4. Gloomy 20. Sunny
5. Dull 21. Destroyed
6. Gay 22. Wretched
7. Low-spirited 23. Broken
8. Sad 24. Light-hearted
9. Unwanted 25. Criticized
10. Fine 26. Grieved
11. Broken-hearted 27. Dreamy
12. Down-cast 28. Hopeless
13. Enthusiastic 29. Oppressed
14. Failure 30. Joyous
15. Afflicted 31. Weary
16. Active 32. Droopy
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Appendix D
Depressive Adjective Checklist -  Form B
DIRECTIONS: Below you will find words that describe different kinds of moods and 
feelings. Circle the words that describe How You Feel Now. Some of the words may 
sound alike, but we want you to circle all the words that describe your feelings. Work 
rapidly and circle all of the words that describe how you feel now.
1. Downhearted 17. Clean
2. Lively 18. Dispirited
3. Unfeeling 19. Moody
4. Alone 20. Pleased
5. Unhappy 21. Dead
6. Alive 22. Sorrowful
7. Terrible 23. Bleak
8. Poor 24. Light
9. Forlorn 25. Morbid
10. Alert 26. Heavy-hearted
11. Exhausted 27. Easy-going
12. Heartsick 28. Gray
13. Bright 29. Melancholy
14. Glum 30. Hopeful
15. Desolate 31. Mashed
16. Composed 32. Unlucky
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Appendix E 
Self Description Questionnaire -  III
This is a chance for you to consider how you think and feel about yourself. This is not a test -  there 
are no right or wrong answers, A nd everyone will have different responses. The purpose of this study is to  
determ ine how people describe them selves and w hat characteristics are m ost im portant to how  people feel 
about themselves.
T he first task is a series of statem ents that are more or less true (or m ore or less false) descriptions o f  
you. Please use the follow ing eight-point response scale to indicate how  true (or false) each item is as a 
description of you. Respond to the items as you NOW  feel even if you felt differently at som e other tim e 
in your life. In a few  instances, an item m ay no longer be appropriate to you, though it was at an earlier 
period of your life (e.g., an item about your present relationship with your parent(s)/guardian(s) if they are 
no longer alive). In such cases, respond to the item as you would have w hen it w as appropriate. Try to 
avoid leaving any items blank. A fter com pleting all the items, you w ill be asked to select those that best 
describe im portant aspects -  either positive or negative -  o f how you feel about yourself. Consider this as 
you are com pleting the survey.
















































I find many mathem atical problem s interesting and challenging.
M y parents are not very spiritual/religious people.
Overall, I have a lot o f respect for myself.
I often tell small lies to avoid em barrassing situations.
I get a lot o f attention from  members of the opposite sex.
I have trouble expressing myself when trying to write something.
I am  usually pretty calm  and relaxed.
I hardly ever saw things the same way as my parents w hen I was grow ing up.
I enjoy doing w ork for m ost academic subjects.
I am  never able to think up answers to problem s that haven’t been already figured out. 
I have a physically attractive body.
I have few  friends of the same sex that I can really count on.
I am  a  good athlete.
I have hesitated to take courses that involve mathem atics.
I am  a spiritual/religious person.
Overall, I lack self-confidence.
People can always rely on me.
I find it difficult to  m eet members of the opposite sex w hom  I like.
I can write effectively.
I w orry a lot.
I w ould like to bring up children of my ow n (if I have any) like m y parents raised me. 
I hate studying for many academic subjects.
I am good at com bining ideas in ways that others have not tried.
I am  ugly.
I am com fortable talking to m embers of the same sex.
I am  awkward and poorly coordinated at many sports and physical activities.
I have generally done better in mathem atics courses than other courses. 
Spiritual/religious beliefs have little to do with my life philosophy.
Overall, I am pretty accepting of myself.
Being honest is not particularly im portant to me.
I have lots o f friends of the opposite sex.
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32. I have a poor vocabulary.
33. I am  happy m ost of the time.
34. I still have many unresolved conflicts w ith m y parents.
35. I like m ost academic subjects.
36. I w ish I had more imagination and originality.
37. I have a good body build.
38. I d o n ’t get along very well w ith other m em bers of the sam e sex.
39. I have good endurance and stam ina in sports and physical activities.
40. M athem atics makes me feel inadequate.
41. Spiritual/religious beliefs m ake my life better and make m e a happier person.
42. Overall, I don ’t have m uch respect for myself.
43. I nearly always tell the truth.
44. M ost o f my friends are m ore com fortable w ith m em bers of the opposite sex than I am.
45. I am  an avid reader.
46. I am anxious much of the time.
47. M y parents have usually been unhappy or disappointed w ith w hat I do and have done.
48. I have trouble with most academ ic subjects.
49. I enjoy working out new  w ays of solving problem s.
50. There are lots o f things about the way I look that I would like to  change.
51. I m ake friends easily w ith m em bers of the same sex.
52. I hate sports and physical activities.
53. I am  quite good at mathematics.
54. M y spiritual/religious beliefs provide the guidelines by w hich I conduct my life.
55. Overall, I have a lot of self-confidence.
56. I sometim es take things that do not belong to me.
57. I am  com fortable talking to m em bers of the opposite sex.
58. I do not do well on tests that require a lot o f verbal reasoning ability.
59. I hardly ever feel depressed.
60. M y values are sim ilar to those of my parents.
61. I am  good at most academic subjects.
62. I am  not m uch good at problem  solving.
63. M y body weight is about right (neither too fat nor too skinny).
64. O ther members o f the same sex find me boring.
65. I have a high energy level in sports and physical activities.
66. I have trouble understanding anything that is based upon mathem atics.
67. C ontinues spiritual/religious growth is im portant to me.
68. Overall, I have a very good self-concept.
69. I never cheat.
70. I am quite shy with m em bers of the opposite sex.
_ 71. Relative to m ost people, m y verbal skills are quite good.
72. I tend to  be highly -  strung, tense, and restless.
_ 73. M y parents have never had m uch respect fo r me.
74. I am  not particularly interested in most academ ic subjects.
75. I have a lot o f intellectual curiosity.
76. I dislike the way I look.
77. I share lots o f activities with m em bers o f the same sex.
78. I am  not very good at any activities that require physical ability and coordination
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79. I have always done well in m athem atics classes.
80. I rarely if ever spend tim e in spiritual m editation or religious prayer.
81. Overall, nothing that I do is very important.
82. Being dishonest is often the lesser of two evils.
83. I make friends easily with m em bers of the opposite sex.
84. I often have to read things several tim es before I understand them.
85. I do not spend a lot of tim e w orrying about things.
86. M y parents treated me fairly w hen I was young.
87. I leam  quickly in most academ ic subjects.
88. I am  not very original in m y ideas, thoughts and actions.
89. I have nice facial features.
90. Not m any people of the sam e sex like me.
91. I like to  exercise vigorously at sports and/or physical activities.
92. I never do well on tests that require m athem atical reasoning.
93. I am a better person as a consequence of m y spiritual/religious beliefs.
94. Overall, I have pretty positive feelings about my self.
95. I am a very honest person.
96. I have had lots o f feelings of inadequacy about relating to m em bers of the opposite sex.
97. I am good at expressing myself.
98. I am often depressed.
99. It has often been difficult for m e to talk to  m y parents.
0 0 .1 hate m ost academic subjects.
0 1 .1 am an im aginative person.
0 2 .1 wish that I were physically m ore attractive.
0 3 .1 am popular w ith other m em bers of the sam e sex.
0 4 .1 am poor at m ost sports and physical activities.
05. A t school, my friends always cam e to m e for help in m athem atics.
0 6 .1 am basically an atheist, and believe that there is no being higher than man.
07. Overall, I have a very poor self-concept.
0 8 .1 would feel ok about cheating on a test as long as I did not get caught.
0 9 .1 am com fortable being affectionate w ith m em bers of the opposite sex.
10. In school I had m ore trouble learning to read than m ost other students.
1 1 .1 am inclined towards being an optimist.
12. My parents understand me.
1 3 .1 get good m arks in m ost academ ic subjects.
1 4 .1 would have no interest in being an inventor.
15. M ost o f m y friends are better looking than I am.
16. M ost people have more friends of the sam e sex than I do.
1 7 .1 enjoy sports and physical activities.
1 8 .1 have never been very excited about mathem atics.
1 9 .1 believe that there will be som e form  of continuation of m y spirit or soul after m y death. 
20. Overall, I have pretty negative feelings about myself.
2 1 .1 value integrity above all other virtues.
2 2 .1 never seem to have m uch in  com m on w ith m embers of the opposite sex.
2 3 .1 have good reading com prehension.
2 4 .1 tend to be a very nervous person.
2 5 .1 like my parents.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Definitely
False












True D efin itely
T ru e
1 2 6 .1 could never achieve academ ic honours, even if I w orked harder.
1 2 7 .1 can often see better ways of doing routine tasks.
1 2 8 .1 am good looking.
1 2 9 .1 have lots o f friends of the sam e sex.
1 3 0 .1 am a sedentary type who avoids strenuous activity.
131. Overall, I do lots of things that are important.
1 3 2 .1 am not a very reliable person.
133. Spiritual/religious beliefs have little to do w ith the type of person I w ant to be.
1 3 4 .1 have never stolen anything of consequence.
135. Overall, 1 am  not very accepting of myself.
136. Few, if any o f m y friends are very spiritual or religious.
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Self-Description Questionnaire-Ill: Importance ratings
D ifferent characteristics, both positive and negative, vary in their im portance in determ ining how you feel 
about yourself. For exam ple, the statem ent “I am m usically talented” m ay be very inaccurate as a 
description of you, bu t it may also be very unim portant about how  you feel about yourself. Below are 
statem ents about different characteristics. For each statem ent please judge;
a) How A CCURATE the statem ent is as a description of you; and
b) How  IM PO RTA N T the characteristic is in determ ining how  you feel (either positive or negative) 
about yourself.
Please use the follow ing response scale:
1 2 3 4 5
Very Inaccurate M oderate










How accurate is this 
statement about you? 
(see above scale)
IMPORTANCE:
How im portant is the 
characteristic to you? 
(see above scale)
I am good at sports and physical activities
I am physically attractive/good looking
I have good interactions/relationships with 
m em bers of the opposite sex.
I have good interactions/relationships with 
m em bers of the same sex.
I have good interactions/relationships with 
m y parents.
I am  an em otionally stable person.
I am a spiritual/religious person.
I am an honest/reliable/trustworthy person.
I have good verbal skills/reasoning ability
I have good mathem atical skills/reasoning 
ability.
I am a good student in  m ost academic subjects 
I am good at problem  solving/creative thinking
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Consent Form A 
SELF-CONCEPT STUDY 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR CONSENT
W hat’s it about?
W e are studying the relationships betw een self-concept (academic, physical appearance, peer 
relations) and depression. This research is being conducted by Dr. Cheryl Thom as (Associate Professor, 
Departm ent of Psychology, University of W indsor; 253-3000, ext. 2252) and D aniel Taylor (Graduate 
Research Assistant; 253-3000, ext. 2217).
If you agree to participate, you will be scheduled to attend a research session in the D epartm ent of 
Psychology where you w ill com plete a questionnaire asking about different areas of your self-concept and 
whether you are experiencing any depressive symptoms. It will take about 30 m inutes of your tim e to 
com plete the questionnaire.
W hat’s in it for you?
Through participation in this study, you will earn one b o n u s p o in t that you m ay subm it for credit in 
any course in which the accum ulation of research credits is permitted. Also, since self-concept is an area o f 
interest and concern for m any university students, responding to  the questionnaire may be intrinsically 
interesting to you. There are no serious risks associated w ith participation. However, you w ill be asked 
about any current depressive symptoms and som e of the questions may cause som e m inor discom fort. 
Should you experience any distress as a consequence of your participation, you m ay call the Psychological 
Services Centre (973-7012) or see a counselor at Student H ealth and M edical Services (973-7002).
Y our rights as a participant
Y our participation in this study is com pletely voluntary and you have the right to w ithdraw  at any 
tim e w ithout penalty or explanation. You m ay refrain from  answering questions you prefer to  omit.
Y our responses are confidential. You will not be asked to put your nam e anyw here on  the 
questionnaire and this consent form  will be stored separately from  your responses to the questionnaire.
Y our individual responses will not be shared with others; only group or sam ple averages will be used in 
research reports about the study.
If you have any questions about the study, you may ask them before, during, or subsequent to your 
participation in the study. A t the conclusion of the study, a summary of the findings will be posted on  Dr. 
T hom as’s office door (CHS 257-2). Any concerns or questions about this study m ay be reported to Dr. 
Stew art Page, Chair, Psychology Ethics Com mittee (253-3000).
PARTICIPANT CONSENT
I understand the inform ation provided above and I consent to participate in the study as described. 
(Please sign both copies o f this form. Return one to the researcher and retain one for your own information 
and records.)
Student Signature; ____________________________  D ate:_________________________________




Hello. Thank you for coming in today. 1 am going to let you have a seat in this 
comfortable chair, which reclines. To start things off I want you to read over this 
consent form, and if you do not have any questions you can sign both copies, keep one 
for your records and then give one to me.
WAIT FOR THEM TO READ OVER CONSENT AND ANSWER ANY 
QUESTIONS. AFTER THEY HAND ME THE INFORMED CONSENT.
Thank you. You have noticed the stereo equipment and you will be listening to 
music on the CD player today (point to it) and instructions on the tape recorder (point 
to it). Both play buttons have been marked so that there is no confusion (point to both 
markers). Unless you have any questions, I am going to leave you with these two sheets 
(DACL A and MIP Instructions). Fill out the first sheet, and then read the experiment 
instructions on the second sheet. When the experiment is over you can come and get me 
outside in the hall. Thanks again for your help with my research.
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Consent Form B 
Consent Form 
Mood and Perception Study
My signature on this sheet indicates that I agree to participate in a study 
assessing the impact of emotional experience on peoples’ perceptions. Part 
of this experiment involves procedures designed to either increase or 
decrease your mood for short periods of time. Signing this form also indicates 
that I understand the following:
1. 1 am a volunteer and can withdraw at any time from the study 
without penalty
2. No harmful outcomes have been documented in association with 
the procedures employed in this experiment. If, however, any of the 
questions or procedures cause any discomfort I can call Student 
Health and Medical Services (973-7002) or Psychological Services 
Centre (973-7012).
3. The data 1 provide will be confidential
4. I may receive a summary of the project, upon request, following the 
completion of the study.
Name of the Participant (please print) Signature of the Participant
Student Number Date




Now that the experiment is completely finished I would like to know if you attempted 
to figure out the purpose of this research. Please list in the space provided below what 
you thought the purpose of the experiment was. Furthermore, please state whether 
your answers were related to how you honestly felt and thought, or whether you 
attempted to “help me out” by providing the answers you thought I wanted.
Purpose of the Experiment
Reasons for your Answers
During the first part of the experimental manipulation today were you focusing
on:
a) mainly yourself
b) mainly someone else
c) both myself and someone else.
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Positive, Self-referent Mood Induction Statements
1. Being in college makes my dreams more possible.
2. The world is full of opportunity and I'm taking advantage or it.
3 .1 know if I try I can make things tum out fine.
4 .1 bet things will go well for the rest of the day.
5. When I have the right attitude, nothing can depress me.
6. Most people like me.
7. I've got some good friends.
8. My parents brag about me to their friends.
9 .1 know I can get the things I want in life.
10. My future is so bright I have to wear shades.
11.1 feel creative.
12.1 can make things happen
13. Nothing can bum me out now.
14. Things look totally awesome.
15. The relationships I have now are the best I've ever had.
16. It doesn't get any better than this.
17.1 can make any situation tum out right.
18.1 feel completely aware.
19. I'm in charge of my like and I like it that way.
20. Life's a blast, I can't remember when I felt so good.
21. I'm going to have it all!
22. When it comes right down to it. I'm just too cool.
23 .1 know I can do it; I'm going to seize the day!
24. I'm energized
25. It's great to be alive!
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Negative, Self-referent Mood Induction Statements
1 .1 feel a little down today.
2. My classes are harder than I expected.
3. Everyone else seems to be having more fun.
4. Sometimes I feel so guilty that I can't sleep.
5 .1 wish I could be myself, but nobody likes me when I am.
6. Today is one of those days when everything I do is wrong.
7 .1 doubt that I'll ever make a contribution to the world.
8 .1 feel like my life is in a rut that I'm never going to get out of.
9. My mistakes haunt me, I've made too many.
10. Life is such a heavy burden
11. I'm tired of trying.
12. Even when I give my best effort, it just doesn't seem to be good enough.
13. Nobody understands me or even tries to.
14 .1 don't think things are ever going to get better.
15.1 feel worthless.
16. What's the point of trying?
17. My parents don't know who I am.
18. When I talk no one really listens.
19 .1 feel cheated by life.
20. Why should I try when I can't make a difference anyway?
21. Sometimes I feel really guilty about the way I've treated my parents.
22. Every time I tum around, something else has gone wrong.
23. I'm completely alone.
24. There is no hope.
25 .1 feel I am being suffocated by the weight of my past mistakes.
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Instructions for the Self-referent Mood Induction Procedures 
INSTRUCTIONS
I will be reading a series of cards with statements typed on them. These statements 
represent a mood state. In order to participate fully and successfully, I will need to be 
willing to feel and experience each statement as it would apply to me personally. In other 
words, when I read each statement, I will allow myself to respond as though the statement 
had been my own original thought. I will go with the feeling and not try to stop it.
1. I will read each of the following statements to myself and then I will read the 
statement aloud.
2. At first I might feel like resisting the mood. However, I will see that it is the case that 
I have the opportunity to leam to talk myself into a mood, and obviously, I will also 
leam how to talk myself out of one. When this happens, I will find that I have learned 
something valuable about myself; I can leam to control my moods. Thus, I will try to 
experience the mood suggested.
3. I will feel each item, making the statement my own. I will experience the mood 
suggested and will not attempt to stop it. I will visualize a scene in which I have had 
such a feeling or thought. Then I will begin to say whatever comes to mind that 
relates to the feeling. This is a type of free association -  letting thoughts that pertain 
to the feeling flow freely.
4. I will also be listening to CD music played on the stereo that has been selected to 
facilitate me entering a specific mood
5. I am now ready to experience the statements that follow. From this point forward 
whenever the voice on the tape recorder instmcts me (every 20 seconds), I will go on 
to the next page. I will spend this 20 seconds reading the statements, listening to the 
music and experiencing the feelings they suggest to me. I am ready to begin.
PLEASE PRESS PLAY ON THE CD PLAYER NOW AND PRESS PLAY ON THE 
TAPE RECORDER.
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Instructions for the Other-referent Mood Induction Procedures 
INSTRUCTIONS
1. You will be viewing a series of images that are accompanied by short stories. You 
will use these images to help guide your imagination in the creation of a story that is 
centered around a close, (male/female) friend.
2. You will be instructed to think about the thoughts and feelings of your friend who is 
the main character in the story. You will also be instructed to write about the 
thoughts and feelings of this friend. Please remember to focus on the thoughts and 
feelings of your friend and not your own.
3. These stories are designed to induce a mood state. In order to participate fully and 
successfully, you will need to be willing to feel and experience the mood suggested 
by the stories. You will go with the feeling and not try to stop it.
4. At first you might feel like resisting the mood. However, you will see that it is the 
case that you have the opportunity to use your imagination to get yourself into a 
mood, and obviously, you will also leam to use your imagination to get yourself out 
of one. When this happens, you will find that you have leamed something valuable 
about yourself; you can leam to control your moods. Thus, you will try to experience 
the mood suggested.
5. You will become involved in each story and experience the mood suggested and not 
attempt to stop it. You will visualize the scenes depicted by the images; using sights, 
smells, and sounds, and concentrate on the thoughts and feelings of your male friend 
that come to mind. This is a type of free association -  letting thoughts that pertain to 
the feeling flow freely.
6. To assist you in creating an appropriate mood you will also be listening to music 
chosen to facilitate mood change.
7. You are now ready to engage in the guided imagery process. From this point forward 
you will use your imagination, combined with the music, to create a story and 
experience the feelings they suggest to you. You are ready to begin.
PLEASE PRESS PLAY ON THE CD PLAYER AND PRESS PLAY ON THE
TAPE RECORDER WHICH WILL PROVIDE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
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Means. Standard Deviations and Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) Examining Pretest 
Group Differences
Experimental mood induction procedure 
N eg-self Neg-other Pos-self Pos-other
Variable (n = 4 6 ) (n = 46) (11 = 44) (n = 43) F (l, 178) E
Age M 20.89 20.5! 21.07 20.16 3.318 .021
SD 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.3
BDI-II M 9.27 8.35 8.39 9.74 .618 .604
SD 6.0 6.0 5.4 5.5
Overgen M 3.52 3.35 3.39 3.59 .419 .74
SD 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1
Self-Concept Subscale
General Esteem M 6.09 6.23 6.23 6.13 .142 .935
SD 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.3
Honesty/Trust M 6.04 6.19 5.83 6.03 1.551 .203
SD 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8
Parent Relations M 6.03 6.00 6.09 5.56 1.718 .165
SD 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4
Emotional Stab M 5.05 5.10 5.13 4.89 .340 .796
SD 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1
Academic M 6.01 5.84 5.68 5.72 1.08 .359
SD 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0
Verbal Ability M 5.81 5.82 5.72 5.88 .243 .866
SD 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Same Sex M 5.87 5.96 5.89 5.89 .057 .982
SD 1.1 I.l 0.8 1.3
Opposite Sex M 5.63 5.99 5.51 5.59 1.29 .279
SD 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.4
Problem Solve M 5.43 5.34 5.40 5.31 .233 .873
SD 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.8
(appendix continues)
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Physical App M 4.94 5.01 4.96 5.10 .202 .895
SD 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.9
Math Ability M 4.32 4.47 4.53 4.27 .218 .884
SD 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.7
Religion/Spiritual M 5.04 5.15 4.59 5.20 1.316 .271
SD 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.7
Physical Ability M 5.56 5.64 5.60 5.58 .019 .996
SD 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.5
S o te . N e g -se lf  = negative-•self; N eg-■other =  negative--other; Pos--se lf =  positive--self; P os-
o th e r  =  p o sitiv e -o th e r; BD I-II =  B eck  D ep ress io n  In v en to ry  II; O v erg en  =  o v e rg e n e ra liz a tio n ; 
E m o tio n al S tab  =  E m o tio n al S tab ility ; P h y sica l A p p  =  P hysica l ap p e a ran c e .





























Pre- and Posttest Affect Mean Scores and Standard Deviations as a Function of Experimental Condition
Affect
P o s itiv e -se lf  (n= 44) N e g a tiv e -se lf  (n= 46)
P re te s t P o s tte s t P re te s t P o stte s t
P o s itiv e -o th e r  (n=  43) 
P re te s t P o stte s t
N eg a tiv e -o th e r  (n= 46) 
P re te s t P o stte st
Variable
M SD M S D M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
DACL neg 2.00a 2.5 0.95b 1.8 1.78a 2.6 5.54b 4.8 2.26a 2.5 1.07b 1.7 1.67a 2.5 7.74b 4.0
DACL pos 5.11a 2.7 6.16b 2.6 4.63a 2.9 1.13b 2.1 4.12a 2.8 4.91a 2.6 4.89a 2.9 0.83b 1.9
VAS happy 66.1a 17.9 74.1b 19.4 60.5a 24.7 36.4b 23.5 62.0a 18.7 67.1a 20.1 63.6, 21.5 25.0b 24.1
VAS sad 18.6a 20.4 17.8, 20.3 19.1a 23.1 48.8b 28.1 21.7a 19.9 22.6a 20.7 18.6a 24.1 60.0b 30.1
Note. Means with different subscripts pre- to posttest differ significantly at p < .01; DACL neg = DACL negative; DACL pos = 







Repeated Measures Multivariate and Univariate Analyses of Covariance for Self- 
evaluations after Negative MIP Conditions for Time x Referent x Overgeneralization, 
With Depression Score as Covariate (n = 92)
A N C O V A
M A N C O V A H o n esty  G en e ra l A ca d em ic S ocia l
S o u rc e F(4, 83) F ( l,  86) T]' F ( l ,  86) Ti' F (l ,8 6 ) (1. 86)
B e tw ee n -su b j ec ts  e ffec ts
BDI-II Covariate 2.37
R e fe re n t (R) .46
O v erg en  (O G ) 3.95” .16 1.97 .02 7 .8 2 "  .08 13.42” * .14 .68 .01
R x O G 1.46
W ith in -su b je c ts  e ffec ts
T im e  (T) 3.12* .13 .04 .00 4.93* .05 4.04* .05 7.29” .08
T X R 2.95* .12 .04 .00 6.78* .07 6.09* .07 1.54 .02
T x O G .60
T  X R  X O G 3.19* .13 1.37 .02 3.57 .04 12.00*” .12 2.56 .03
Note. F ratios are Pillai’s approximation of Fs. MANCOVA = multivariate analysis of 
covariance; ANCOVA = univariate analysis of covariance; rf  = eta squared; BDI-II = Beck 
Depression Inventory II; Overgen = pretest overgeneralization (dichotomized into high and 
low groups). Univariate F’s that are significant at Holm’s modified Bonferroni are 
indicated in boldface.
*p < .05, **p < .01., ***p < .001
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Appendix R
Frequency of Completing Post-experiment Questionnaire as a Function of Experimental
Condition (N = 179)
Experimental Completed Questionnaire
Condition Yes No Total
Negative-self 2 46 46
Negative-other 5 41 46
Positive-self 9 35 44
Positive-other 10 33 43
Total 26 153 179
Note. y^(3.N= 179) = 8.22, E = . 042.
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Negative-self 27 0 6 33
Negative-other 4 11 28 43
Positive-self 23 1 7 31
Positive-other 1 12 31 31
Total 55 24 59 138
Note. 7-16. N =  138) = 77.68, p < .001
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Negative-self 5 15 20 40
Negative-other 5 14 25 44
Positive-self 4 15 15 34
Positive-other 10 10 13 33
Total 24 54 73 151
Note. x^(6,N =  151) = 8.05, E> .05
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Appendix U
Change in Self-evaluations. Pre- to Posttest, as a Function of Experimental Condition 
for Insightful Participants
Dependent Negative-self Negative-other Positive-self Positive-other
Variable t ( d f =19) g  t (d f  =24) g  t (d f  = 14) g  t ( d f =12) g
Honesty 1.60 .126 2.12 .045 -2.44 .029 -1.34 .205
General 2.75 .013 1.46 .157 -1.25 .232 .32 .756
Academic 2.99 .007 1.68 .107 -.01 .997 -.09 .929
Social 2.55 .020 1.41 .172 -1.24 .235 .89 .393
Math 1.11 .282 .11 .916 1.60 .132 -1.22 .246
Religion 1.71 .104 -.53 .602 -.22 .828 -1.61 .133
Note. Negative t values indicate an increase in scores from pre- to posttest. Positive t 
values indicate a decrease in scores from pre- to posttest.
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Appendix V
Change in Self-Evaluations. Pre- to Posttest, as a Function of Experimental Condition 
for Combined Insight Group (Insightful and Mood Manipulation Subgroups')
D ep en d en t N e g a tiv e -se lf  N e g a tiv e -o th e r  P o s itiv e -s e lf  P o s itiv e -o th e r  
V aria b le  t  ( d f  = 3 4 ) g  t  ( d f  = 3 8 ) p  t ( d f  = 2 9 )  g  t  ( d f  = 2 2 ) g
H onesty .871 .390 1.31 .198 -3.13 .004 -.01 .992
G enera l 2.75 .009 2 .17 .036 -2.2 .036 -.796 .435
A cadem ic 2.92 .006 1.76 .087 .59 .559 -.27 .537
S ocia l 2 .18 .037 2 .07 .046 -1 .08 .291 -.696 .494
M ath .978 .325 1.57 .125 .94 .355 -1.91 .0 6 9
R elig ion 1.98 .055 .379 .707 .10 .921 -.65 .523
Note. Negative t values indicate an increase in scores from pre- to posttest. Positive t 
values indicate a decrease in scores from pre- to posttest.
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Appendix W
Change in Self-Evaluations. Pre- to  Posttest, as a  Function of Experimental Condition 
for Combined Insight Group (Lack of Insight and Mood Manipulation Subgroups')
D ep en d en t N e g a tiv e -se lf  N e g a tiv e -o th e r  P o s itiv e -s e lf  P o sitiv e -o th e r  
V aria b le  t  ( d f  =  19) p  t  ( d f  =  18) p  t ( d f  =  18) p  t  ( d f  =  19) g
H onesty -1 .3 2 .205 -1 .30 .211 -2 .77 .013 .02 .988
G en era l 1.18 .252 1.82 .086 -1 .93 .069 -1 .37 .188
A cadem ic .82 .421 .16 .877 .85 .406 .04 .972
S ocia l -.34 .737 1.62 .124 .04 .971 -1 .62 .123
M ath .90 .380 3.75 .001 -.05 .959 -1 .54 .140
R elig ion 1.02 .321 -.29 .775 .22 .827 1.68 .109
Note. Negative t values indicate an increase in scores from pre- to posttest. Positive t 
values indicate a decrease in scores from pre- to posttest.
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Appendix X
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Evaluations for Insightful Participants 
After Negative MIPs With Pretest Overgeneralization. Referent, and Pretest 
Over generalization X Referent (n = 44).
Predictor General Academic Social
Variable B P t(39) B P t(39) B P t(39)
Constant .90 .85 1.97 2.41* -.03 -.03
Pretest
Covariate .78 .64 4.39"* .63 .57 4.28*** .92 .75 6.60***
BDI-II
Covariate -.01 -.06 -.38 -.03 -.19 -.1.09 .02 .10 .64
OG .08 .08 .67 .09 .12 .64 -.06 -.06 -.39
Referent (R) .36 .29 2.82" .29 .34 2.94** .22 .19 1.84
Pretest
O G X R -.31 -.29 -2.67* -.23 -.31 -2.64* -.09 -.09 -.88
Note. Pretest overgeneralization scores were centered before the product term was 
calculated. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II; OG = overgeneralization.
p* < .05, p“ <.01 . p“ *<.001
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Appendix Y
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Evaluations for Combined Insight 
Group (Insightful and Mood Manipulation Subgroups) After Negative MIPs With 
Pretest Overgeneralization. Referent, and Pretest Overgeneralization X Referent (n = 
79).
Predictor General Academic Social
Variable B P t(78) B P t(78) B P t(78)
Constant 1.32 1.75 1.85 2.76“ -.23 -.42
Pretest
Covariate .73 .65 5.76“ * .64 .58 5.7“ * .97 .84 11.4*“
BDI-II
Covariate -.02 -.10 -.81 -.09 -.07 -.51 .02 .12 1.1
Pretest OG .04 .01 .03 -.04 -.07 -.49 -.05 -.06 -.54
Referent (R) .24 .21 2.71“ .16 .20 2.23* .11 .10 1.38
Pretest
O G X R -.22 -.23 -2.93“ -.18 -.28 -3.1“ -.07 -.08 -1.11
Note. Pretest overgeneralization scores were centered before the product term was 
calculated. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II; OG = overgeneralization, 
p < .05, p < .01. p < .001
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Appendix Z
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Evaluations for Combined Insight 
Group (Lack of Insight and Mood Manipulation Subgroups) After Negative MIPs 
With Pretest Overgeneralization. Referent, and Pretest Overgeneralization X Referent
(n = 38).
Predictor General Academic Social
Variable B P t(33) B P t(33) B P t(33)
Constant .1.37 1.86* 1.14 1.75 .17 .43
Pretest
Covariate .76 .76 6.09*** .80 .76 7.29*** .94 .94 15.46***
BDI-II
Covariate -.02 -.12 -.92 -.00 -.00 -.02 .02 .1.46 1.46
OG -.03 -.04 -.25 -.09 -.17 -1.16 -.07 -.10 -.1.11
Referent (R) .06 .06 .68 .01 .02 .15 -.06 -.06 -.95
Pretest
O G X R -.06 -.09 -.93 -.07 -.14 -1.36 .02 .02 .36
Note. Pretest overgeneralization scores were centered before the product term was 
calculated. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventor^' II; OG = overgeneralization, 
p < .05, p < .01. p < .001
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